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Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: 
Normative and Empirical Challenges 
 
Sonja B. Starr* 
January 19, 2015 
 
 This piece explores the many kinds of quantitative claims that researchers and 
commentators regularly make about race and policing.  Everyone agrees that there are enormous 
racial gaps in U.S. rates of stops, arrests, searches, and use of force. But there are dramatically 
conflicting claims as to why. Policing is hard to study, but the problem isn‟t just the data 
shortcomings with which the literature has long struggled. It‟s confusion about what questions we 
should be asking. Different kinds of numerical comparisons and research designs often imply sharply 
differing conceptions of what racial equality in policing means.  These normative premises often go 
unstated, such that readers may easily miss these differences.  The overarching objective of this Article 
is to highlight the connection between the normative and the empirical. I identify plausible conceptions 
of racial equality in policing and assess which empirical methods can best test those conceptions.  
 The Article gives particular attention to how researchers should address two important 
research questions.  The first is whether criminal conduct differences explain policing disparities.  
Empirical researchers as well as casual commentators typically purport to address this question either 
by comparing racial groups‟ shares of police interactions to their shares of crime, or by comparing two 
groups‟ ratio of police interactions to their ratio of crimes. Using examples and mathematical proofs, 
I show that neither of these comparison types answers the key question whether people with like 
criminal conduct are being treated the same way. These comparisons generally overcorrect for racial 
differences in criminal conduct, misleadingly masking the size (or even reversing the apparent 
direction) of disparities in policing of people with the same conduct.  Second, I examine how 
researchers should investigate the effects of racial discrimination—a morally important and legally 
central question, but one that poses serious causal inference challenges.  I review several methods in 
the current literature, which offer useful insights but have substantial limitations, and critique the 
recently dominant “hit-rate” approach, which relies on faulty normative and empirical premises. 
Instead, I propose supplementing existing tools with a new approach: the use of “testers.” 
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to Alicia Davis, Avlana Eisenberg, Mark Fancher, Jim Greiner, Sam Gross, Louis Kaplow, Randy 
Kennedy, David Moran, J.J. Prescott, Eve Brensike Primus, Jon Sacks, Margo Schlanger, Michael 
Steinberg, Kim Thomas, and participants in the Michigan Law Faculty Brownbag for helpful 
comments and conversations. Brian Apel, Grady Bridges, Alex Harris, Avi Kupfer, Linfeng Liu, and 
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As recent events have painfully illustrated, public debates over race and policing 
are typically catalyzed by flashpoints—individual, terrible cases, often involving 
police killings of unarmed civilians. But these debates are shaped by competing 
underlying understandings of the everyday realities of law enforcement. On average, 
people of color in the United States, especially black men, interact with police far 
more often than white Americans do. Black men are 2.5 times as likely to be arrested 
as white men, and local studies show even larger gaps in stops, searches, and use of 
force, though there are no national numbers.1 The existence of these gaps is not 
contested; the reasons are. Do these patterns reflect race-based targeting, or 
differences in criminal conduct? Or are there other contributing factors—for 
example, are citizens more likely to report crimes with minority suspects? 
Such questions sharply divide public opinion—largely along racial lines2—and 
among public commentators, polar opposite answers are each often presented as 
essentially indisputable.3  This dissensus does not merely result from one side or 
another ignoring or twisting facts. Rather, these questions also have no clear answer 
in the large empirical literature. The problem goes beyond heterogeneity across 
locations and police forces, and beyond well-recognized data limitations. It stems in 
part from normative and conceptual confusions that suffuse the field. Researchers 
often do not articulate exactly what question they seek to answer and why 
policymakers should care about it. Sometimes, they pose one question but use an 
empirical model that effectively answers another.   
This Article is an effort at clarity. It is written from an empiricist‟s perspective, 
but isn‟t an empirical paper and doesn‟t answer the questions posed above. Instead, 
it addresses threshold questions about research objectives and design: First, what 
should policing-disparity studies seek to estimate, and why? Second, what empirical 
strategies can best identify those quantities of interest?  I hope this discussion will be 
useful not just for researchers, but also for policymakers, judges, and citizens who 
wish to make sense of the bewildering array of statistics on race and policing and to 
recognize when those statistics are misleading. 
There is no single answer to the question of what researchers should estimate; 
the answer depends on the purpose of the research.  But policing-disparity 
researchers typically seek to inform policy or legal debates in some way, so they 
                                                 
1 See infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text (discussing raw disparity statistics). 
2 E.g., Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen Perceptions, 83 
SOCIAL FORCES 1009, 1017 (2005) (finding blacks are six times likelier than whites to believe racial 
profiling is a problem). 
3 For example, a recent letter from dozens of civil rights and community leaders called the pattern 
of young black men subjected to “aggressive police tactics…too obvious to be a coincidence and too 
frequent to be a mistake…[I]t is time for our country to counter the effects of systemic racial bias.” 
Letter from Maya Rockeymoore et al., to President Obama (Aug. 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ad/public/static/letter/. By contrast, prominent 
commentator Heather Mac Donald stated: “It is black crime rates that predict the presence of blacks 
in the criminal justice system. Not some miscarriage of justice.” Meet the Press, Aug. 17, 2014. 
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should focus on some objective that matters (or should matter) to policymakers or 
lawyers. When such researchers specify their empirical models, they are not just 
making technical decisions. Rather, their choices imply normative judgments about 
what racial equality in policing means and what inequalities are worth studying.  
When researchers do not explicitly explain those judgments, it‟s easy for legal and 
policy commentators to misunderstand the studies‟ implications. Sometimes, 
researchers themselves seem to share those misunderstandings. 
To illustrate these problems in more depth, much of this Article focuses on two 
types of inequality that hold particular policy or legal interest: (1) disparity in police 
interactions conditional on criminal conduct (that is, holding criminal conduct 
constant); and (2) the causal effects of police racial discrimination.  These are not the 
only worthwhile targets of empirical research, but they are important ones. 
Extensive research and commentary focuses solely on whether race gaps in 
policing are explained by crime, ignoring other potential explanatory variables.  This 
literature contains a rich and important debate about how to measure crime, and I 
offer thoughts on the competing methods.  But I focus chiefly on unexamined 
problems concerning what researchers should do with whatever crime measure they 
settle on—that is, what does it mean to “account for crime”? 
To explore this question, one first must ask why so many scholars and 
commentators focus exclusively on crime‟s explanatory role. The answer isn‟t just its 
descriptive importance.  Rather, the shared assumption seems to be that crime 
differences could potentially justify policing differences in a way that other 
explanations cannot. The most plausible reasons for this assumption imply a 
particular equality objective: people with the same criminal conduct should face the 
same probability of police interactions, regardless of race.  This principle is an 
instantiation of the moral intuition that like cases should be treated alike. 
But the specific types of policing-to-crime comparisons that pervade the 
literature fail to test whether equality in this sense exists. The two common 
approaches compare a group‟s share of police interactions to its share of crimes, or 
compare the ratio of two groups‟ police interaction rates to the ratio of their crime 
rates. The assumption is that racially equitable policing would produce a racial 
distribution of police interactions that mirrors the distribution of crime.  The basic 
problem is that this would only be so if everyone the police interact with is guilty of 
the crime(s) in question.  In reality, though, few police interventions are confined to 
the guilty.  Even if the police are quite good (but not perfect) at targeting the guilty, 
Share/Share and Ratio/Ratio comparisons can be surprisingly misleading. 
As I show with examples and mathematical proofs, when there is racial equality in 
policing of those with like conduct, Share/Share or Ratio/Ratio comparisons always 
misleadingly suggest disproportionality—specifically, that the higher-crime group is 
being “underpoliced” after accounting for crime.  And when the higher-crime group 
is in fact “overpoliced” on average conditional on criminal conduct, the common 
comparisons mask those disparities‟ size, or even reverse their apparent direction.  
The literature is thus rife with comparisons that overstate the extent to which race 
gaps in police interactions can be explained by criminal conduct. (Even those arguing 
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that crime does not fully explain policing gaps draw such comparisons, generally with 
the effect of understating their arguments.) These comparisons seem intuitively 
sensible, but our intuitions are wrong. While “accounting for crime” is a valid 
objective, the specific ways crime is routinely “accounted for” exaggerate its 
explanatory value. I offer thoughts on how we can get the right numbers instead. 
The second estimand on which I focus, the effect of police racial discrimination, 
is central to equal protection doctrine, and is also important for policy purposes; the 
experience of being targeted because of race is a key reason why communities often 
see heightened police presence as a burden. But empirically identifying racial 
discrimination is difficult. It requires disentangling other potential causes of 
disparity—not just criminal conduct, but other potential confounding variables, 
some of which may be unobservable to researchers.  
The literature has taken a variety of approaches to this problem.  Economic 
literature has recently been dominated by the “hit-rate” approach, which posits that 
irrational police discrimination can be measured by comparing the rates at which 
police actions produce evidence of crime.  Unfortunately, although this approach is 
mathematically elegant, it does not tell us anything we should care about.  It is 
unrelated to any defensible conception of either equality or efficiency, relies on 
implausible empirical assumptions, and makes demonstrably false predictions.  
More insight can be gained from various more traditional observational methods, 
although significant omitted-variables and sample-selection concerns mean that 
cautious interpretation is required; moreover, many studies use inappropriate 
controls that themselves reflect discretionary police decisions. Some clever studies 
exploit variation in decision-makers‟ access to race information, potentially providing 
stronger causal identification, but these too have substantial limitations.  Finally, lab 
experiments demonstrating prevalent implicit racial bias support stronger causal 
inferences, but do not tell us how these biases translate into real-world outcomes. 
To supplement these tools, I propose a new approach: “auditing” the police 
using paired testers of different races. Auditing is a staple of research on (and 
enforcement of laws against) employment, housing, and lending discrimination. In 
the policing context, the approach has not been tried, likely due to safety, ethical, and 
legal concerns. I discuss ways to mitigate these concerns through careful research 
design and cooperation with police departments or other government agencies.  
Despite its challenges, this approach offers something that other methods generally 
do not: the promise of strong causal identification in a real-world setting. 
Part I describes raw racial gaps in U.S. police interactions and their relationship 
to punishment disparities, and introduces normative questions surrounding their 
empirical assessment. Part II examines how and why the relationship between 
policing gaps and criminal conduct should be estimated. Part III examines the 
estimation of police racial discrimination, and proposes the auditing method. 
I. Stakes and Objectives 
In this Part, I discuss what‟s at stake in efforts to quantify racial disparities in 
policing. Section A describes the problem these efforts seek to explain: large race 
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gaps in criminal justice involvement. I also show that without understanding policing 
disparities, it is difficult to interpret disparities in later criminal process stages and in 
incarceration. Section B outlines various possible objectives of empirical estimation.  
A. Race and Criminal Justice 
Let‟s begin with what we know: people of color, especially black men, are 
involved in the U.S. criminal justice system at highly disproportionate rates. These 
“raw” disparities have been the focus of some empirical work,4 some scholars‟ policy 
arguments,5 and much media coverage.6 Herein, I use the term “disparity” to refer to 
raw outcome gaps, not to any particular reason for those gaps, unless specified. 
1. Disparities in Police Interactions 
In 2011, the arrest rate for all black adults was approximately 10%; the rate for all 
white adults was approximately 4%. 7  Rates are especially high for black men. 8 
African-Americans on average are arrested on more serious charges: compared to 
whites, nearly four times as often for violent crime, eight times for murder 
specifically, four times for drug sales or manufacturing, and 4.5 times for weapons 
offenses.9 These figures (and the underlying data) don‟t differentiate by Hispanic 
ethnicity; if African-Americans were compared to non-Hispanic whites, the gaps 
would surely be larger.10 Because black-white disparities are particularly large, I use 
them as the paradigmatic research target in this Article. Estimating other 
demographic disparities poses the same basic challenges.  
We lack national data on pre-arrest policing decisions, including traffic and 
pedestrian stops, frisks, and searches.11 However, local studies have reported large 
                                                 
4 E.g., Michael R. Smith & Matthew Petrocelli, Racial Profiling? A Multivariate Analysis of Traffic Stop 
Data, 4 POLICE Q. 4, 9-12 (2001); Jeff Rojek et al., The Influence of Driver‟s Race on Traffic Stops in Missouri, 
7 POLICE Q. 126 (2004). 
5 E.g., I. Bennet Cappers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizienship, and the Equality Principle, 
46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law 
of the Land, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010); Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in 
the Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 721 (2004). 
6 E.g., Jess Bidgood, Boston Police Focus on Blacks in Disproportionate Numbers, Study Shows, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2014; see Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, 
in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 181 (2010) (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds.) 
(describing “compulsion in media reports” to focus on these comparisons). 
7 These rates come from the online arrest rate calculation tool from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm#.  
8 Id. The BJS data are not broken down by race and sex combined, but in general, men are more 
than three times as likely to be arrested as women are. 
9 Id. 
10 Hispanic incarceration rates are nearly twice those of non-Hispanic whites, Leah Sakata, Breaking 
Down Mass Incarceration in the U.S. Census, Prison Policy Initiative, May 28, 2014, so arrest rates are 
presumably also higher. In the ethnically undifferentiated data, far more Hispanics are likely described 
as “white” than as “black.” See U.S. Census Bureau Working Paper, America‟s Churning Races, 16 tbl. 1.  
11 E.g., Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1129-30 
(2013). See also Samuel R. Gross & Katherine R. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction 
on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 678-82 (2002) (observing that police can fudge data, such as by 
“ghosting,” reporting stops of white drivers that never occurred). 
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gaps.  For example, “Blacks were subjected to 63% of [police-pedestrian] encounters, 
even though they made up just 24% of Boston‟s population.”12 Police data fairly 
consistently show that black and Hispanic drivers are disproportionately stopped and 
searched.13 Data on use of force are limited, but fatalities are well documented. From 
1976 to 1998, African-Americans were four times as likely as whites to be killed by 
police.14 A new, federally funded initiative is developing a national Justice Database 
covering stops and use of force.15  
2. Incarceration Disparities and their Relationship to Policing 
Raw disparities in U.S. incarceration rates are even larger. Black men are 
incarcerated at six times the rate of non-Hispanic white men (and fifty times that of 
white women); Hispanic men fall midway between. Because the U.S. has an 
exceptionally high overall incarceration rate,16 these gaps translate into astonishing 
total numbers. One in fifteen adult black men is currently behind bars, including one 
in nine under age 35. 17  The lifetime incarceration hazard for black males is 
approximately 1 in 3.18 When probation and parole figures are added, one-third of 
black men under 35 are currently under criminal justice supervision.19  
Researchers have generally attributed the majority of incarceration disparity to 
arrest differences.20 So to understand the reasons for incarceration gaps, we need to 
understand why there are such sharp racial differences in arrests. Without this 
understanding, we also may know less than we think we know about disparities in 
subsequent process stages, such as sentencing. Studies of later process stages use 
samples consisting only of cases that made it into the criminal justice system and use 
control variables (such as arrest offense or conviction offense) that are shaped by 
police officers‟ earlier decisions. Police discrimination could introduce sample 
selection bias and could distort the control variables as well. 
To illustrate, assume that white and black crime patterns are identical, but that 
police discriminate against blacks, such that other factors equal, police are more 
likely to arrest black suspects, or to arrest them on more serious charges (for 
example, describing an assault as “aggravated”). If so, the black arrestee pool for any 
                                                 
12 ACLU, “Black, Brown, and Targeted: A Report on Boston Police Department Street Encounters 
from 2007-2010,” at 1 (2014), https://www.aclum.org/sites/all/files/images/education/ 
stopandfrisk/black_brown_and_targeted_online.pdf. 
13 Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275-76 (2004). 
14 Jodi M. Brown & Patrick A. Langan, Bur. Just. Statistics, Policing and Homicide, 1976-1998 (2001). 
15 See Center for Policing Equity, Nation‟s First Police Profiling Database Awarded Grant By NSF, Nov. 7, 
2013, http://cpe.psych.ucla.edu/images/uploads/database_release_final_%281%29.pdf. 
16 E.g., Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-
23prison.12253738.html?pagewanted=all.  
17 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (Feb. 2008). 
18 Bonczar, supra note 2, at 1. 
19 Id. at 2. 
20 See Brett E. Garland et al., Racial Disproportionality in the American Prison Population, 5 JUST. POL‟Y J. 
1, 21-26 (2008) (reviewing studies); Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations 
Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743 (1993) (finding that 76% of the black-white incarceration gap stems 
from arrest patterns). 
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given arrest offense will contain some weaker or less-serious cases that would not 
have resulted in arrest on that charge were the arrestee white. If studies of 
subsequent prosecutorial and judicial decisions do not account for this, they may 
overlook substantial differences in the cases they are comparing. Controlling for the 
arrest offense does not result in an apples-to-apples comparison if the arrest offense 
means something different depending on race.21 
Researchers have often ignored these problems; instead, they should 
acknowledge them, and interpret their results cautiously in light of reasonable 
assumptions guided by the policing literature.22 For example, if we can assume police 
probably don‟t tend to discriminate against whites, then estimates of unexplained 
disparities favoring whites in subsequent processes are likely conservative. 
Researchers can also offer sensitivity analyses showing effects of competing 
assumptions about arrest disparities. But the bounds implied by such analyses might 
be wide, because the uncertainty about arrest disparities is great. To develop a clearer 
empirical picture of later procedural stages, we need a better handle on policing. 
3. Consequences of Criminal Justice Disparities 
Data on raw disparities help us to understand who is bearing the burdens of our 
expansive criminal justice system.  These burdens include the social consequences of 
mass incarceration 23  and the potentially lifelong legal and socioeconomic 
consequences of having a criminal record.24 The harms of police interactions are not 
confined to the guilty—most stops and searches produce no evidence of 
wrongdoing.25 Even if no charges are brought, arrest records can produce stigma, 
job-market consequences, and increased sentences in future cases.26 And even absent 
arrest, interacting with police is often stressful and scary, and the experience of being 
racially targeted can amplify the emotional and dignitary costs.27  
When police use force, the impacts on individuals and communities can be 
especially acute, as recent events, including the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric 
Garner and their aftermath, have amply demonstrated.  This Article does not focus 
primarily on disparities in the use of force, which raise distinct normative concerns 
                                                 
21  The vast majority of sentence-disparity studies compound the problem by using samples of 
sentenced cases and controlling for conviction or sentencing-stage severity measures, failing to account 
for disparities in charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing fact-finding. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit 
Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 
123 YALE L.J. 2, 39-77 (reviewing literature and explaining this problem). 
22 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases, AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
__ (2014) (forthcoming) (following this approach). 
23 See, e.g, Garland et al., supra note 20, at 9-14 (reviewing literature). 
24 See James Forman, Jr., Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U L. REV. 21, 28-32 (2012). 
25 See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, in 
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 49. 
26 See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can 
Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2014. 
27 See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 212-13; Rod 
Brunson, Beyond Stop Rates: Using Qualitative Methods to Examine Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 224-33 (interviewing young black men in St. Louis). 
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and have been hard to study due to lack of data. Rather, although some of the points 
I make apply to use-of-force disparities, my primary focus (and that of the existing 
policing-disparity literature) is on investigative interactions, such as stops, searches, 
and arrests.  These issues are, of course, entangled. One key reason those killed by 
the police are predominantly black men is that black men are vastly more likely to be 
stopped by the police in the first place, creating far more interactions that can go 
terribly wrong.  And fear of excessive force is one of the factors that can make a 
“routine” police interaction not just inconvenient, but traumatic. 
Of course, policing seeks to prevent crime, and crime damages communities too. 
And some crimes (for example, homicide) are more commonly committed both by 
and against people of color 28—which is unsurprising in light of socioeconomic 
stratification by race.29 If the police were to fail to arrest more members of groups 
that commit more crimes, they might be fairly criticized for underserving communities 
of color, especially because most crimes with victims are intraracial.30 Such a failure 
could send an expressive message devaluing victims of color. Analogously, critics 
have condemned victim-race disparities in capital sentencing for implying that “a 
black life simply is worth less than a white life.”31  
One might ask, then: do policing disparities harm or benefit the “over-policed” 
group? In some contexts, the answer is clearly “harm,” because the harms are 
concentrated on the group while the benefits are shared by everyone, or because it is 
the innocent within the group, not the guilty, who face excessive policing. But in 
other contexts, there are real tradeoffs between the community‟s interests in 
reducing policing burdens and reducing crime, so the answer is less obvious.  
These questions resist generalizable answers. Other bodies of empirical 
scholarship have struggled with estimating the costs of crime and incarceration and 
the effects of incarceration and policing on crime.32 The cost of stops, searches, and 
arrests remain unquantified, as do the effects of community resentment of police. 
These factors surely vary across groups and localities, and communities‟ perceptions 
of what balance of benefits and burdens is appropriate may also vary.33  Disparity 
researchers typically do not seek to answer the “net benefits” question (nor do I); 
they provide a different piece of the puzzle for policymakers. 
                                                 
28  Crime in the United States 2011, Expanded Homicide Data, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/offenses-known-to-law-
enforcement/expanded/expanded-homicide-data (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
29E.g., Patrick Bayer et al., Separate When Equal? Racial Inequality and Residential Segregation, 82 J. URBAN 
ECON. 32, 32-33 (2014). 
30 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997) (“The principal injury suffered 
by African-Americans in criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement….”); Dan 
M. Kahan & Tracy L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1166 (1998); 
Harris, supra note 25, at 49. 
31 Christian Halliburton, Neither Separate Nor Equal, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOCIAL JUST. 45, 54 (2004). 
32 See David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner‟s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 905 (2013) (reviewing this literature). 
33 Within many black communities that once pushed for aggressive law enforcement, public opinion 
has also shifted over time. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
285-87 (2011); Forman, supra note 31, at 34-39. 
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C. Conceptions and Causes of Disparity: Possible Research Objectives 
Imagine that policing-disparity researchers could gather whatever data they 
wanted. What would we prioritize doing with it? This kind of thought experiment is 
often a valuable guide to empirical research. Here, the answer turns on questions 
about what kinds of inequality matter.  
Consider the following claims about what would constitute racial equality in a 
city‟s law enforcement. For the purpose of this exercise and the rest of the Article‟s 
hypotheticals, I assume that we are assessing stops. One could substitute other 
outcomes, such as searches or arrests or downstream outcomes like incarceration, 
without fundamentally changing the analysis. 
1. The racial distribution of stops should track the racial distribution of the population. 
2. The racial distribution of stops should track the racial distribution of crime commission. 
3. A racial disparity in stop rates is only justified if it is proportional to a disparity in crime rates.  
4. Holding criminal conduct constant, the probability that someone will be stopped should not 
differ by race. 
5. The police should not consider race when deciding whom to stop. 
6. The police should consider race only when doing so improves their odds of catching criminals. 
While some of these formulations sound fairly similar, they express different 
ideas. Formulation (1) treats raw disparities as troubling inequalities, regardless of the 
reason.  Formulations (2) through (4) focus solely on disentangling the explanatory 
role of crime (implicitly treating other explanations as unwarranted sources of 
disparity).  Of these, versions (2) and (3) are the most common conceptions of 
equality tested by the empirical literature; such studies compare stop data to some 
measure of crime across groups.34 In Part II, I argue that version (4) is a better way 
to think about “accounting for crime,” and show that it‟s quite different from 
versions (2) and (3). Version (4) could be teased out into separate sub-principles 
requiring racial equality in policing of the innocent and in policing of the guilty.35   
Formulations (5) and (6) are different in kind. They focus on decision-making 
inputs, not on outcome gaps and their crime justifications. Testing them requires 
filtering out a broader range of factors (not just crime), to isolate some variety of 
racial discrimination (a term I use here in its narrow, “disparate treatment” sense). 
Formulation (5) treats all police uses of race as suspect, while Formulation (6) 
reflects a recently prominent approach distinguishing between “irrational” prejudice 
and “rational” use of empirical information.  
Many other nuances are possible. When disparity researchers specify an empirical 
model, they make many decisions about what sources of disparity “count.” For 
                                                 
34 See infra Part II (reviewing this literature). 
35 A few scholars have called for separate analysis of disparities among the innocent and guilty. 
David Thacher, From Racial Profiling to Racial Equality, unpublished, 8 
http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/page.jsp?paperid=1092784&searchTerm=commission+for+racial; 
R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169 
(2006); Jeff Dominitz, How Do the Laws of Probability Constrain Legislative and Judicial Efforts to Stop Racial 
Profiling?, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 412, 414 (2003). In Part II, I assess how this can be done effectively. 
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example, should researchers control for the neighborhood?  Some argue that one 
shouldn‟t: excessive targeting of minority neighborhoods is a potentially important 
source of unjustified disparity, not something that should be filtered out. 36  The 
counterargument is that intra-neighborhood disparities—albeit not the whole story—
are also important.37 Filtering out neighborhood effects allows those disparities to be 
studied in a causally rigorous way, because neighborhoods differ in many ways that 
could confound analyses of race‟s effects. 
A reader might reasonably object that most empirical papers frame their 
objectives as descriptive. To describe racial disparities as being explained in part by 
some variable does not necessarily imply that the part mediated by that variable is 
normatively justified.  For example, I may want to disentangle the effects of racial 
discrimination from those of socioeconomic discrimination even if I believe both are 
troubling. Empiricists need not specify which explanations are “bad” and which are 
“good”—they need merely decide which ones are worth disentangling. 
This is a fair objection, but it only goes so far. First, many studies do explicitly 
offer estimates of “unwarranted” disparities.  Second, empiricists studying race and 
policing cannot be blind to the context in which their work will be received.  The 
subject matter is high-profile and emotionally and politically charged. Statistics are 
cited often by virtually everyone in the relevant policy and legal discussions.  And 
those citing statistics clearly do not think of them as being normatively neutral.  So 
when a study reports a bottom-line number that it characterizes as the “racial 
disparity holding other factors constant,” for example, that will be read by most 
readers as “the unjustified racial disparity.”  That means researchers should think 
carefully about what other factors they hold constant.   
Just as importantly, authors in that situation should clearly explain their choices 
and why they made them, what their estimates represent, and what they don‟t 
represent.  They should not bury these issues deep in the methods section—they 
should be front and center.  Choices like what control variables are included are not 
technicalities; they define what the study is measuring.  Moreover, if researchers aim 
to tease out the roles of several different factors in producing disparities, they should 
present results in a way that highlights those roles, rather than just highlighting the 
disparity that is left over once identified factors are filtered out.38  
Instead, the empirical literature is largely either quiet or confusing on questions 
like these. Some studies use methods that do not mask the task they purport to 
address—for example, stating a concern with “racial profiling,” but employing 
analyses that focus only on ruling out crime differences.39 Scholars also sometimes 
                                                 
36 See Fagan et al., supra note 116, at 316. 
37 Indeed, unwarranted intra-neighborhood disparities may raise especially acute fairness concerns: 
they burden one racial group while neighbors of all races enjoy the crime-prevention benefits. In 
contrast, extra policing of a neighborhood confers both benefits and burdens on that neighborhood. 
38 Various decomposition methods from labor economics are designed for this purpose, but are 
rarely used in the criminal justice literature.  See, e.g., Starr, supra, at 14 tbl.4. 
39 E.g., James E. Lange et al., Testing the Racial Profiling Hypothesis for Seemingly Disparate Stops on the New 
Jersey Turnpike, 22 JUSTICE Q. 193, 194-95 (2005).  Some also cite raw disparities as evidence of racial 
profiling. E.g., Cappers, supra note 5, at 14-19; Johnson, supra note 5, at 1073. 
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mischaracterize one another‟s arguments because of confusion about these framing 
issues—for instance, mistaking the choice to estimate a particular type of disparity 
for an empirical claim that only that type of disparity exists.40  
In Parts II and III, I seek to clarify the relationships among different objectives, 
to discuss what the “right” questions are, and to examine ways of answering them. 
Part II focuses on the relationship between policing disparities and crime, and Part 
III focuses on analysis of police decision-making, especially the role of racial 
discrimination.  In highlighting these questions, I do not mean to devalue the 
importance of measuring raw disparities (version 1). But the raw disparity picture is 
already relatively clear, so I do not focus on it, instead focusing on why the gaps exist.  
II. Policing Disparities and Crime 
In analyses of the “why” question, the usual starting point is crime. Indeed, it‟s 
also often the ending point: many analyses assess only whether crime differences can 
explain policing gaps.  This Part examines how crime‟s explanatory role should be 
analyzed. I begin with the question of how to measure crime, and then ask whether 
crime “benchmarks” are being deployed in normatively meaningful ways, even 
assuming their accuracy.  I show that the ubiquitous types of policing-to-crime 
comparisons do not mean what people imply when they use them.  They do not tell 
us whether people with like conduct are being treated the same way.  
A. Crime Benchmarks and the “Denominator Problem” 
The search for crime “benchmarks” has long been seen as the key empirical 
challenge of policing-disparity research.41 Indeed, the problem of unmeasured crime 
bedevils essentially all empirical research related to crime.42  Many police forces have 
started collecting better data on whom the police are stopping, searching, and 
arresting. But without data on criminal conduct, we have nothing to compare this to. 
We have what many call a “denominator problem.”43 
The problem is really twofold. First, criminal justice datasets include no 
information about cases that never enter the justice system—that is, the vast majority 
                                                 
40 For example, Pickerill et al. claim that legal scholars who focus on racially disparate treatment 
assume “race is the sole factor that causes police to search motorists. J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Search 
and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A Disparate Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL‟Y 1, 2 (2009) 
Engel likewise claims that “the legalistic perspective” assumes away racial differences in crime rates 
and assumes racial profiling is always ineffective. Robin S. Engel, A Critique of the „Outcome Test‟ in 
Racial Profiling Research, 25 JUSTICE Q. 1, 5-9 (2012). Both claim that such legal scholars believe raw 
disparities are never normatively justified. Id. at 9; Pickerill et al. supra, at 5.  But such claims are not 
common in legal literature, and none are “legalistic”; the law makes it hard to infer discrimination 
from disparity. It is perfectly consistent to critique disparate treatment while recognizing that other 
factors also contribute to disparities.  See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 150-51. 
41 E.g., Robin Shepard Engel & Jennifer M. Calnon, Comparing Benchmark Methodologies for Police-Citizen 
Contacts, 7 POLICE QUARTERLY 97, 98, 100 (2004); Ridgeway, supra, at 19. 
42 See, e.g., Albert D. Biderman & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., On Exploring the „Dark Figure‟ of Crime, 374 
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POLIT. & SOCIAL SCIENCE 1, 1 (1976). 
43 E.g., Meaghan Paulhaumas et al., State of the Science in Racial Profiling Research, in RACE, ETHNICITY, 
AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 239. 
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of crimes. For example, surveys suggest there are at least hundreds of millions of 
drug crimes per year, but only about 1.5 million drug arrests.44 Even most reported 
violent and property crimes go unsolved.45 Second, even for those who do interact 
with police, we lack objective conduct measures. Rather, we have what officers write 
down, and in a study of policing disparity, one shouldn‟t assume this is accurate.  
This situation is not really a data collection failure, however: nobody thinks the 
data in question ought to be collected comprehensively. The value that society places 
on freedom from constant surveillance requires that the vast majority of crimes go 
uncounted (not to mention unpunished). So researchers must rely on imperfect, 
incomplete proxies. But what makes a good proxy? 
Some scholars use arrest rates, often from a prior time period, to stand in for 
crime rates.  But this introduces a troubling circularity: arrests are discretionary 
decisions by the very actors whose stops are being studied. What is really being asked 
is thus not “Does crime explain stop disparities?” but “Are stop disparities bigger 
than arrest disparities?” Arguably, arrest benchmarks might sometimes be defensible 
as deliberately conservative,46 but they should generally be avoided. 
Reported crime is a better alternative, but is still imperfect. Crime reports are 
collected by local agencies and compiled by the FBI.47 The principal problem is that 
most crime goes unreported—about half of violent crimes and 60% of property 
crimes, according to victim surveys.48 Moreover, minor and victimless crimes are 
                                                 
44  See Office of Nat‟l Drug Control Pol‟y, Fact Sheet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/ nsduh_fact_sheet_9-7-11_0.pdf (about 23 million Americans 
use illicit drugs each month).  For arrest rates, see the online calculation tool at 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm#.  See also Impaired Driving, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv_factsheet.html (finding 1% 
arrested out of 112 million self-reported drunk-driving instances). 
45  Nationally, under 20% of reported property crimes and 45% of reported violent crimes are 
cleared. Crime in the United States 2012, Clearances, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-
in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances. 
46 For instance, Fagan et al., supra note 116, at 318-19, and Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the 
NYPD‟s Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 813, 818-20 
(2012), find disparities in stop-and-frisk rates after controlling for prior-year arrests. Their estimates 
are likely conservative, assuming arrest and stop disparities cut in the same direction.  
47 The FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provide summary data for certain crimes, but have no 
race information except for homicides. Crime in the United States 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement. 
Some agencies participate in the National Incident-Based Reporting System, which includes suspect 
race. U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, FBI, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM: DATA 
COLLECTION GUIDELINES (2000), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/nibrs/manuals/v1all.pdf. Some studies 
use crime-report data from local sources. E.g., Howard P. Greenwald, Final Report: Vehicle Stops in 
Sacramento, California, Report to the City of Sacramento (2001); Ridgeway, supra, at 13. 
48 Jennifer L. Truman, Criminal Victimization, 2010, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin, September 
2011, 1, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf. Garland et al., supra, at 19-20, respond that 
reported crime is the right comparison point because “the criminal justice process does not begin until 
the police become aware of a crime,” so police are not responsible for reporting disparities. But much 
policing is proactive, not report-driven. See Ridgeway, supra, at 18 (finding 30% of NYPD stops 
responded to citizen calls). Regardless, here, we are assessing whether policing burdens are fairly 
distributed conditional on criminal conduct, not whether to blame police for any maldistribution.   
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almost never reported,49 so reported-crime benchmarks are usually based on “index 
crimes,”50 violent crimes, or even just homicide. 51  But if stop or arrest rates are 
driven heavily by drugs or minor crimes, comparing them to such benchmarks may 
introduce bias. Racial differences in crime rates are believed to be far greater for 
violent crime, especially homicide.52 So using violent-crime benchmarks to proxy for 
all crime risks substantially overstating the extent to which disparities in stops or 
arrests are explained by differences in criminal conduct.  
Another alternative is survey data. Some surveys, such as the Census Bureau‟s 
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), gather data about crimes with 
victims.53 Other surveys ask individuals to self-report drug use. These generally show 
only minor racial differences in drug use,54 findings that scholars often contrast with 
large race gaps in drug arrest rates.55 Survey benchmarks avoid some of the concerns 
raised above: they cover crimes not reported to police, are not themselves shaped by 
police, and encompass a wider variety of crimes. But there remain concerns about 
accuracy.56 Also, national surveys‟ samples are not designed to produce valid local 
estimates.57 And most drug surveys cover only use, not supply.58  
                                                 
49 Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in 
the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 317 (1997). 
50 The eight crimes used in the Uniform Crime Reports “index”: murder, forcible rape, arson, 
larceny, robbery, burglary, car theft, and aggravated assault. 
51 E.g., Fagan et al., supra note 116, at 318-19 (using homicide); Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in the New York Police Department‟s Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices, RAND Corp. Rep‟t TR-
534 xii, 19, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR534.html (using violent crime).  Again, 
this choice might be defensible as conservative: Fagan et al. find disparities despite using the homicide 
benchmark, which is striking given the likely downward-biasing effect.  But it is clearly inappropriate 
to use violent-crime benchmarks to show lack of disparity, as Ridgeway does. 
52  Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota‟s Prison and Jail 
Populations, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 238 (2009). 
53  For the questionnaire, see http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvs2_2012.pdf. See Shima 
Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 201 (2013) (citing the NCVS). 
54  Monitoring the Future I, 9, http://monitoringthefuture.org//pubs/monographs/mtf-
vol1_2013.pdf; Dep‟t Health & Hum. Servs., Results from the 2013 Nat‟l Survey of Drug Use and Health 26, 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHr
esults2013.pdf. 
55 E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 6-7; Yonette F. Thomas, The Social Epidemiology 
of Drug Abuse, 32 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. S141 (2007); see also Gross & Barnes, supra note 11, at 
681 (comparing survey data to traffic stop rates); Christopher L. Griffin, Jr. et. al., Corrections for Racial 
Disparities in Law Enforcement, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1365, 1381-82 (2014) (using surveys on DWIs). 
56 See Barry Spunt, Self-Report Surveys, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1465, 1466-
67 (David Levinson ed.) (2002); Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Minority Arrest, 23 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 42-45 (1997). 
57 Brian Wiersema, Area-Identified National Crime Victimization Survey Data, NCVOR Census Ctr. Tech. 
Paper 1 (1999), http://www.ncovr.heinz.cmu.edu/docs/Wiersema-Area-Identified%20NCVS.pdf; 
Dep‟t Health and Human Servs., Substance Abuse and Mental Health Admin., State Estimates of 
Substance Abuse from the 2006-07 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health 7-9 (2009). 
58 One survey that did ask questions about drug sales found somewhat higher rates among blacks, 
albeit not high enough to explain the arrest gap. See Frase, supra note 52, at 239. 
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Given existing datasets‟ limits, some researchers have gathered new data by 
physically observing public behavior—usually traffic violations. The seminal example 
was John Lamberth‟s 1994 study of the New Jersey Turnpike, in which researchers 
drove just over the speed limit and observed the drivers who passed them; the racial 
composition of speeders was compared to Turnpike stop data.59 Subsequent highway 
speeding studies have used radar.60 Alpert et al. similarly physically observed traffic 
violations on city streets.61 Outside the traffic context, Dabney et al. used video 
cameras in a store to observe shoplifting—an innovative method, though the study‟s 
analysis is unfortunately hard to interpret. 62 The study also illustrates a key concern 
with benchmarking generally: the appropriateness of comparing behavioral and 
policing-outcome data from different sources. The authors compare shoplifting 
apprehension figures from a national study to shoplifting rates at a single store, 
which could be atypical. The highway-speeding studies do better on this score, 
comparing observed behavior with stop data from the same highways. 
The direct-observation method has promise for behaviors (like traffic offenses) 
occurring in predictable, public locations where researchers or recording devices can 
be stationed. It could usefully be applied to law enforcement checkpoints, which 
could record agents‟ behavior and that of individuals passing through, plus any 
computer-database information that agents observe. This approach could go beyond 
traditional benchmarking, measuring individuals‟ behavior and agents‟ treatment for 
the same sample, instead of comparing across different datasets.63 But most policing 
contexts are not a good fit for direct observation—most crime occurs in private or 
unpredictable places. For such conduct, the best available benchmark probably 
remains victim reports or survey data, despite these sources‟ limitations. 
B. Criminal Conduct as a Possible Justification for Policing Disparities 
Once one has settled on a crime benchmark, what should one do with it?  To 
answer this question, we need to ask why so much research focuses on whether 
crime explains policing disparities to the exclusion of other possible explanations.  
                                                 
59  John Lamberth, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops and Arrests of Black 
Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Between Exits or Interchanges 1 and 3 from the Years 1998 through 
1991, Nov. 11, 1994. Fifteen percent of speeders and 35% of those stopped were black.  
60 See Lange et al., supra note 39, at 211-12; Robin S. Engel et al., Pennsylvania State Police Project 
on Police-Citizen Contacts, Year 2 Report 64-65, 110 (2002) 
61  Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Investigating Racial Profiling by the Miami-Dade Police Department, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL‟Y 25, 36, 41-44 (2007) (finding no unjustified racial disparity in stops). 
62 The authors find no racial disparities in shoplifting after controlling for shopper behaviors such as 
product-tampering, but these controls seem to filter out part of the shoplifting conduct itself. Dean A. 
Dabney et al., Who Actually Steals? A Study of Covertly Observed Shoplifters, 21 JUST. Q. 693, 711 (2004).  
63 Federal agencies have already conducted self-studies designed to produce racial benchmarks 
for comparisons to checkpoint stops. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Assessing Measurement Techniques 
for Identifying Race, Ethnicity, and Gender N.C.J. Report 196855, 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ascii/amtireg.txt (2003). However, these studies merely recorded 
the race of those passing through, plus (in an airport security study) some additional information such 
as gender, age, and number of carry-ons. This could easily be extended to record agent responses, 
individual behavior, and computer-system information. 
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One possibility is crime‟s descriptive importance. Many scholars have argued that 
crime differences are the single most important explanation for race gaps in U.S. 
arrest and incarceration rates. 64   But this does not really explain why so many 
analyses focus on crime exclusively. Some policing-to-crime comparisons (such as 
the common comparison of drug arrest rates to use rates) do not actually find that 
crime substantially explains policing disparities.  And even when it does, other 
factors may also be important. Indeed, when other contributors to disparity are 
layered on top of substantial crime differences, it amplifies their consequences.65 In 
any event, crime-disproportionality analyses are not designed to support strong 
causal inferences. They tell us whether policing rates are in line with what we would 
expect based on crime patterns, not why they are or are not.66 
But there is another reason for the focus on crime. Many researchers and 
commentators appear to treat crime differences as potential justifications for disparities 
in police interactions, not just explanations. Meanwhile, policing disparities that are 
disproportionate to crime differences are presented, explicitly or by implication, as 
unjustified. The crime-disproportionality question seems to get at many people‟s core 
intuitions about what makes racial disparities in the justice system not just 
unfortunate, but unfair. So what underlies these intuitions?  
 Start with an oft-repeated principle: like cases should be treated alike. The limits 
of this principle have been much debated,67 but it is clearly a widely shared intuition, 
at least as a default rule.68 A sensible way of understanding the literature‟s emphasis 
on crime benchmarks is that criminality is what determines which cases are 
meaningfully “like.” If so, when we say policing should be “proportionate” to crime, 
we imply a specific objective: equal policing of people of different racial groups conditional on 
their criminal conduct. Assuming a simplified binary guilty/innocent division, this 
objective requires that (1) the probability that an innocent person will be stopped 
does not vary by race, and (2) the probability that a guilty person will be stopped 
does not vary by race. We can express these objectives as follows:  
( )   
   
   
⁄
   
   
⁄
  , and ( )   
   
   
⁄
   
   
⁄
   
                                                 
64 E.g., KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 23, TONRY, supra note 73, at 79; Forman, supra note 31, at 31-32.  
65  For example, suppose crime could explain the vast majority of the 6-to-1 black-white 
incarceration gap, i.e., whites were only 10% less likely to be incarcerated than blacks with the same 
criminal conduct.  Even then, that gap would be consequential: reducing black incarceration by 10% 
would mean restoring the liberty of more than 1% of all black men under 35 in the United States (1 in 
9 of whom are now in prison). See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal 
Sentences, 122 J. POLIT. ECON. 1320, 1349-50 (2014) (making a similar calculation). 
66
 For instance, policing patterns that are unexplained by crime might result from racial 
discrimination, or from applying race-neutral criteria that are differentially accurate across races.  
67 E.g., David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, U. Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working 
Paper No. 24, at 3 (2002); Kenneth Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
68 See Strauss, supra, at 3 (arguing, however, that there are often good reasons to depart from it). 
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S stands for “stops” and P for “population,” subscripts I and G stand for “innocent” 
and “guilty,” and subscripts 1 and 2 identify the two racial groups being compared.  
DI and DG are ratios of the groups‟ stop rates among the innocent and guilty, 
respectively. One can easily complicate proposition (2) to accommodate many 
varieties of criminality; the objective remains that those with the same culpability 
should face the same probability of apprehension.  
Why does criminal behavior determine “likeness”? One strong argument is based 
on moral desert. Policing is not punishment, but it facilitates it, so if we think 
criminals deserve punishment, we should want them to face police stops, searches, 
and arrests; we should also want the innocent to avoid such interactions. The police 
lack perfect information, so they cannot stop every criminal and will stop some 
innocents. But if the probability of these errors varies by race, there is racial 
inequality unjustified by criminal conduct.69  
Two clarifications are important here. First, I am not suggesting that the higher-
crime group as a whole deserves heavier policing. The concept of “group desert” finds 
no support in retributive precepts,70 and affixing blame to an entire race would be 
particularly repugnant. Nonetheless, targeting of guilty individuals can in the aggregate 
produce group outcome differences.  Second, I exclude use of force from the 
discussion of whether crime differences “justify” policing disparities.  I do not think 
that criminal culpability means that one deserves to be subjected to physical violence 
by police. Use of force may occasionally be justified based on different kinds of 
moral considerations, focused on imminent risk.  But such situations cannot be 
identified using crime benchmark data. 
An alternative to the retributive rationale for treating crime as a special 
justification is to focus on the rule of law. The “like cases” principle is often 
described as a rule-of-law value: it “entails and is entailed by conformity to law.”71  If 
so, then law determines what cases are “like”—in the policing context, criminal law 
specifically. This argument focuses more on preventing arbitrary decision-making 
than on outcome fairness, but still implies that policing rates should be equal across 
racial groups conditional on criminal conduct.72 
Note that one can embrace this objective without thinking that we shouldn‟t 
worry about disparities that are explained by criminal conduct.  But in that case, the 
worry wouldn‟t be that policing is misaligned with what it‟s supposed to target. 
                                                 
69 See Thacher, supra note 35, at 2 (arguing for goal of “racial equality within morally homogeneous 
groups”). 
70 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1369 (2003); Joshua Dressler, 
Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 103-08 (1985).  
71 Winston, supra, at 5. 
72 A counterargument is that perhaps what should determine “likeness” is behavior outwardly signaling 
likely criminality, legally justifying a stop. This would be inconsistent with the moral desert objective, 
but one could defend it from the rule-of-law perspective. We lack data on underlying suspiciousness, 
however, and it is a readily manipulable characterization. The problems I identify below with policing-
to-crime comparisons assume that actual criminality is the intended measure of “likeness.” If 
suspiciousness were the right measure and if crime is a poor proxy for it, that would raise additional 
problems for policing-to-crime comparisons, since they have the wrong comparison point entirely. 
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Instead, it might focus our attention on root causes of crime differences (for 
example, educational inequities and poverty), or else on the overall scope and 
severity of our criminal law and its enforcement, given its disparate impact.73 Those 
who present policing-to-crime comparisons do not necessarily imply that these other 
types of inequality don‟t matter, but they do imply that inequality in police 
interactions among people who have done the same thing is a distinct fairness 
problem that merits empirical measurement and policy concern. 
Richard Banks, Jennifer Eberhardt, and Lee Ross have called for separate 
attention to disparities in policing of the guilty and of the innocent, respectively. This 
call is persuasive: stops, searches, and arrests of the innocent are different kinds of 
events from the same treatment of the guilty, and affect communities differently. 
The authors go farther, however, asserting that when offending rates differ, “one 
cannot attain equality across groups with respect to both the investigation of the 
innocent and the apprehension of the guilty.”74 They claim: 
If the crime rate is higher among Blacks than Whites, but the rates of investigation 
are the same, then an African American criminal will be less likely to be apprehended 
than a white criminal. To equalize across groups the likelihood that a criminal will be 
apprehended would require increasing stop-search rates among Blacks, which would 
have the unfortunate consequence of also increasing the likelihood that innocent 
Blacks are investigated…. Either innocent members of the higher crime rate group 
will be subject to a greater likelihood of investigation, or a greater percentage of 
criminals from the higher crime rate group will be permitted to stay at large.75  
This dilemma sounds daunting, and indeed, tradeoffs like this can sometimes 
emerge in practice, and are worth highlighting. But the authors‟ claim is much too 
strong. It is certainly possible to simultaneously equalize across races stop 
probabilities for both the innocent and the guilty, even with very different crime 
rates. For instance, randomized enforcement, such as at some DUI checkpoints, 
would always satisfy both requirements. As another example, suppose police stop 
suspected drunk drivers if and only if those drivers swerve. Suppose that regardless 
of race, 60% of drunk drivers swerve and 10% of sober drivers swerve. The race-
neutral swerving criterion means that 60% of drunk drivers get stopped and 10% of 
sober drivers get stopped, regardless of race, whatever each racial group‟s drunk-
driving rate is. Stop productivity (the percentage of stops that catch drunks, which is 
not the same as the percentage of drunks who get stopped) will be higher for 
whichever group has a higher drunk-driving rate. But this is troubling only if equal 
productivity is an important metric of equality. As I argue below, it isn‟t.76 Many 
other examples are given in the next Section and the appendix. 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 79-
80, 105 (1995); Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1487-89 (2000). 
74 Banks et al., supra note 35, at 1178-79. 
75 Id. at 1179. 
76 Banks et al. also seem to conflate the question whether black and white criminals face the same 
rate of apprehension with the question whether the police leave “more Black criminals than White 
criminals at large as a proportion of the group‟s population.” Id. at 1179. Equalizing the prevalence of 
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So there is nothing necessarily incompatible about racial equality in policing of 
both the guilty and the innocent—and if we want to assess whether criminal conduct 
“justifies” policing differences, we should ask whether those objectives are being 
achieved. Unfortunately, as I show below, the literature comparing policing rates to 
crime rates has overwhelmingly failed to ask that question. 
C. Disproportionality Ratios: Are We Asking the Right Questions? 
When researchers and commentators ask whether policing is “proportional” to 
crime, what proportion are they referring to? Two comparison types are widespread. 
I show here that neither is consistent with the “treat like cases alike” objective. 
Again, my hypotheticals use “stops” as the policing outcome of interest, but others 
could substitute; many examples that I cite from the literature focus on arrests. 
First, many analyses ask: Is the ratio of police interactions for two groups 
different from the ratio of crimes? For example, Prof. Michael Tonry writes that for 
adult men, the ratio of black to white self-reported violent crimes is “4:1, which is 
„very similar to differences observed in the Uniform Crime Reports of arrests for violent 
offenses at this age,‟ unlike the adolescent years when the self-report ratio is 1.5:1 
and the arrest ratio is 4:1.” 77 His implication is that among adults, the arrest gap is 
explained by offending differences, but among adolescents, it‟s not. 
The implied conception of inequality is sometimes formally expressed by 
dividing the ratio of stop rates by the ratio of crime rates.78  I label this “Stop 
Ratio/Crime Ratio” or “Ratio/Ratio” disproportionality: 
Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio = 
           
           ⁄
            





   
   
⁄
 
For racial groups 1 and 2, S is the number of stops and PG is the number of criminals 
(or crimes79). These comparisons are sometimes framed in terms of rates of stops and 
                                                                                                                                     
criminals-at-large is not the same as equalizing apprehension rates conditional on criminality.  The 
former is an appealing aspiration, but may be unachievable via policing alone if underlying crime rates 
are quite different, unless crime rates are highly elastic.  Even if it could be done, it might require a 
police presence that communities would find intolerable—and would likely require one group to have 
a much higher apprehension rate for both the innocent and the guilty than the other group has. 
Realistically, policing can‟t cancel out the many social and historical causes of crime-rate differences.  
77 TONRY, supra note 73, at 78-79. For similar examples, see Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 
& Leadership Conference Education Fund, Justice On Trial: Racial Disparities in the American Criminal 
Justice System (2000), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/justice-on-trial/juvenile.html (citing the 
same ratios as Tonry‟s concerning adolescents); Baradaran, supra note 53, at 201-02 (pointing to 
relatively similar ratios as evidence of lack of substantial unjustified disparity);  American Civil 
Liberties Union, Blacks Found to Be 3.3 Times More Likely to Be Arrested for Marijuana Possession Than 
Whites in Michigan, Despite Equal Usage Rates (Jun. 4, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-
reform/blacks-found-be-33-times-more-likely-be-arrested-marijuana-possession-whites (pointing to 
different arrest and crime ratios as evidence of unjustified disparity); Maia Szalavitz, Study: Whites More 
Likely to Abuse Drugs Than Blacks, TIME, Nov. 7, 2011 (same); Halliburton, supra, at 55 (same); Griffin, 
supra, at 1381-82  (comparing arrest and self-report rates for DWI). 
78 See, e.g., Robert D. Crutchfield, Warranted Disparity? Questioning the Justification of Racial Disparity in 
Criminal Justice Processing, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 30 tbl. 2 (2004). 
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crimes, but it is equivalent to use total numbers instead; the “per capita” parts of 
each rate term cancel.80   The implication is that when crime differences explain 
policing disparities, the stop ratio equals the crime ratio (so the Ratio/Ratio measure 
is 1). “Guilt” and “innocence” are generally presented as binary, but one could 
extend the concept to more complex scenarios.81  
The other common framing compares a group‟s share of total stops to its share 
of total crime. I refer to this as “Stop Share/Crime Share” or “Share/Share” 
disproportionality.  For example, the debate over stops on the New Jersey Turnpike 
has revolved around these comparisons, beginning with Lamberth‟s finding that the 
black stop share was 35% while the black share of speeders was 15%. On the other 
side, prominent commentator Heather MacDonald cites a finding that 25% of the 
drivers going 80mph in a 65mph zone were black; she then states: “Blacks are 
actually stopped less than their speeding behavior would predict—they are 23 
percent of those stopped.”82 Similarly, a RAND Corporation study of NYPD‟s stop-
and-frisk policy (cited heavily by the NYPD) concludes that “blacks are substantially 
understopped” because they constitute 53% of all stops but 69% of violent-crime 
suspect descriptions.83 Other examples abound.84 
These comparisons imply that racially equitable policing should result in a racial 
distribution of stops that parallels the racial distribution of crime.  So if a group‟s 
stop share is bigger than its crime share, it is overpoliced relative to other groups, 
after accounting for crime; if the stop share is smaller, it is underpoliced; if they are 
                                                                                                                                     
79 The denominator here refers to guilty people, which tracks some prominent studies—for example, 
those that count speeding drivers. Alternatively, one could use number of crimes in a given period. For 
this purpose, these approaches are conceptually equivalent: the ratio of total crimes in a period should 
equal the average ratio of people committing a crime at all moments during that period.  
80 See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 53, at 201-02 (using raw numbers instead). Using raw numbers 
changes the stop ratio and the crime ratio, but in the same proportion, making the ratio-of-ratios 
equivalent.  If the stops and crime data come from different samples with different racial 
compositions, however, the rates on the left must first be calculated within each sample.   
81 For example, one could imagine a denominator combining various crime frequencies into some 
severity-weighted measure, or calculate separate ratios for each crime condition. 
82 Heather Mac Donald, The Racial Profiling Myth Debunked, CITY JOURNAL (2002), http://www.city-
journal.org/html/12_2_the_racial_profiling.html. 
83 Ridgeway, supra, at 19. 
84 E.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing another NYPD 
share/share comparison); REBECCA M. BLANK ET AL., MEASURING DISCRIMINATION 193 (2004) 
(comparing 18% black speeding share to 73% search share); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF 
CRIME 35 (1998) (comparing 38% black crack-user share to 85% conviction share); Robert J. 
Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United 
States, 21 CRIME & JUSTICE 311, 328 (1997) (comparing 56% black robbery suspect share to 61% 
arrest share); Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence Why It May Prove the Best First Step in 
Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 CRIM. JUST. 2, 52 (1995) (comparing shares of domestic violence reports and 
arrests); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998) (comparing 
speeding and stop shares); Lange et al, supra note 39, at 211; Stacey Patton, If You're White, That Joint 
Probably Won't Lead to Jail Time, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2014 (comparing 14% black drug-user share to 
34% drug-arrest and 53% drug-incarceration shares); Heather MacDonald, How to Increase the Crime 
Rate Nationwide, WALL STREET J., June 12, 2013, A17 (“Blacks, at 55% of all police-stop subjects in 
2012, are actually understopped compared with their 66% representation among violent criminals.”).    
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about equal, there is no unjustified racial disparity. In the empirical literature, such 
comparisons are often formalized as another kind of disproportionality ratio: 
Stop Share/Crime Share = 
  
 ⁄




S1 and PG1 represent stops and criminals (or crimes) in Group 1 and S and PG 
represent stops and criminals (or crimes) in the whole population.85  
These two disproportionality measures are not the same. The Ratio/Ratio 
measure compares two groups; the Share/Share measure compares one group to 
everybody. One obvious distinction is that “everybody” may include more than two 
groups. But even assuming a two-group world, the comparisons differ, because the 
Share/Share approach compares Group 1 to the whole population including itself, 
while the Ratio/Ratio measure compares it to Group 2 only. The measures always 
cut in the same direction, but the Share/Share measure is always closer to 1; it is 
“diluted” because it is partially a self-comparison.86 Another difference (illustrated in 
the Appendix) is that the Share/Share measure depends on the groups‟ sizes. 
More importantly, neither the Ratio/Ratio comparison nor the Share/Share 
comparison tests whether there are racial disparities in policing of people with the 
same criminal conduct.  These comparisons can easily be misinterpreted as answers 
to that question (indeed, they certainly seem intended to answer it), but this 
interpretation is misleading. I illustrate this point here with just two examples.  The 
Appendix provides many more, plus proofs of the key propositions. 
The core problem can be explained fairly simply. Suppose two racial groups have 
different crime rates, and neither the probability of an innocent being stopped nor 
that of a criminal being stopped varies by race. Should we expect the racial 
distribution of stops to parallel the distribution of crimes?  Our intuitions may say 
yes, but the answer is no—not unless only criminals are stopped.87 When we include 
the innocent in the numerators of all the ratios (the stop terms) but not the 
denominators (the crime terms), the comparisons don‟t work.  The effect of this 
                                                 
85 E.g., Engel et al., supra note 60, at 104-09 (calculating traffic stop share/speeding share ratios for 
each of 27 Pennsylvania counties.); see Engel, supra note 40, at 9 (describing wide use of this method). 
86 See Appendix, Proof 2. 
87 Although this problem has been widely overlooked, the district court in the recent Floyd stop-and-
frisk litigation in effect identified an extreme example of it, saying that comparisons to crime shares 
were irrelevant because almost all those stopped were innocent. 959 F.Supp.2d at 584-85. The court 
held that the better benchmark was each racial group‟s overall population (within neighborhoods), not 
its guilty population. Id.  (It relied on analyses that included other controls as well.) Note, however, 
that this is alternative will usually raise the opposite problem—not “accounting for crime” at all, 
instead of overcorrecting. We would only expect the distribution of stops to mirror the population 
distribution if the police stop people at random. That may have been nearly true in Floyd; only 2% of 
those stopped had any kind of contraband, which the plaintiffs argued made it essentially like a 
random stop. Floyd v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034, Report of Jeffrey Fagan 63-65. Still, in most 
contexts, stop rates are surely at least somewhat higher for the guilty than the innocent. In the next 
Section, I discuss alternative methods that neither assume that everyone stopped is guilty nor that 
those stopped are a random subset of their racial groups. 
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numerator/denominator mismatch cuts in a specific direction: it inflates the stop-
crime ratio more for the lower-crime group than for the higher-crime group.  So it 
looks like the lower-crime group is relatively overstopped after “accounting for 
crime,” even though this hypothetical assumes equitable policing. 
In practice, it‟s rarely only criminals who are stopped, searched, or arrested, even 
if the police never overreach their authority—the law doesn‟t expect perfect accuracy 
in policing.  Indeed, we can expect many police interactions with the innocent even 
when police are quite good at predicting guilt. That‟s because in most contexts, the 
innocent far outnumber the guilty. For example, if stop rates among the guilty are 20 
times those among the innocent, but there are 20 times as many innocent people, 
half of those stopped will be innocent.  
Let‟s work through two examples.  Both assume a simple world with two racial 
groups (black and white) and two criminal conduct conditions (innocent and guilty). 
I also assume the premise of defenders of policing disparities is correct: black crime 
rates are higher.  I‟ll show that it‟s precisely when crime-rate disparities are large that 
Share/Share and Ratio/Ratio comparisons are most misleading. 
The first example assumes racially equitable policing conditional on criminal 
conduct. Suppose the police, looking for weapons, stop pedestrians if and only if 
they appear to have objects in their jacket pockets. Assume that regardless of race, 
50% of weapons-carriers (“guilty”) and 25% of non-carriers (“innocent”) have 
bulging pockets and are stopped—but black pedestrians are twice as likely to have 
weapons (40% versus 20%). Table 1a gives the expected breakdown of stops if the 
police encounter 100 black and 100 white pedestrians, and Table 1b calculates the 
Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures. 
Table 1a. Example Assuming Racial Equality Conditional on Conduct 
Both Races: Assume Innocent Stop Rate = 25%, Guilty Stop Rate = 50% 









[SG= PG* 0.5] 
Total Stops 
[S=SI + SG] 
Black (40% Guilty) 60 15 40 20 35 
White (20% Guilty) 80 20 20 10 30 
 
Table 1b. Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share Calculations: Same Example 
 Black/White Ratio Black Share of Total 
Total Stops 35/30 = 1.167 35/65 = 0.538 
Guilty 40/20 = 2 40/60= 0.667 
Disproportionality 
Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio = 
1.167/2 = 0.583 
Stop Share/Crime Share = 
0.538/0.667 = 0.807 
 
Both disproportionality measures are well below 1, from which scholars and 
commentators would typically infer that black pedestrians are “understopped” once 
you “account for crime.” For example, the Ratio/Ratio interpretation would be that 
after accounting for crime, black pedestrians are 58% as likely to be stopped as white 
pedestrians. The Share/Share comparison meanwhile implies that the black stop 
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share is 81% of what it “should” be. Both are very misleading, given that we‟ve 
assumed equal policing conditional on criminal conduct. (The Share/Share measure 
is less spectacularly wrong here, but it isn‟t always; it‟s just always closer to 1.) 
Now consider a second example, in which policing isn‟t racially equitable. Table 
2a makes the same assumptions as in Table 1a except for lower white stop 
probabilities. Innocent white pedestrians get stopped at a rate of just 15%, while 
innocent black pedestrians get stopped at a 25% rate.  Meanwhile, guilty white 
pedestrians get stopped at a 30% rate, and guilty black pedestrians at a 50% rate.  
Table 2b shows the resulting Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share calculations. 
Table 2a. Example Assuming Racial Disparity Conditional on Conduct 
Black: Assume Innocent Stop Rate = 25%, Guilty Stop Rate = 50% 
White: Assume Innocent Stop Rate = 15%, Guilty Stop Rate = 30% 











[S=SI + SG] 
Black (40% Guilty) 60 15 40 20 35 
White (20% Guilty) 80 12 20 6 18 
 
Table 2b. Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share Calculations: Same Example 
 Black/White Ratio Black Share of Total 
Total Stops 35/18 = 1.944 35/53 = 0.660 
Guilty 40/20 = 2 40/60= 0.667 
Disproportionality 
Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio = 
1.944/2 = 0.972 
Stop Share/Crime Share = 
0.660/0.667 = 0.991 
 
Here, the racial distribution of stops approximately equals the racial distribution 
of crimes.  The black stop share is 66% and the black crime share is 66.7%; the crime 
ratio also slightly exceeds the stop ratio.  These are the kinds of numbers that police 
departments and their supporters routinely cite to show that differences in stop rates 
are fully explained by crime differences.  Indeed, if anything, these comparisons 
create the impression that black pedestrians are very slightly understopped; both 
disproportionality measures are slightly below 1. But that conclusion would be very 
misleading.  Remember, this example assumes that the police are substantially 
overstopping black pedestrians—they are 1.67 times as likely to stop a black pedestrian 
than a white pedestrian with the same criminal conduct.   
These problems with Share/Share and Ratio/Ratio comparisons aren‟t an artifact 
of the particular numbers I chose. The Appendix‟s proofs and additional examples 
show that anytime group crime rates differ and some innocents are stopped, the 
comparisons are at least somewhat misleading, and under many realistic sets of facts, 
they can be drastically so.  Specifically: 
 Racially equal policing of both the innocent and the guilty always results 
in the higher-crime group having a lower stop/crime ratio, and a stop 
share below its crime share. Thus, both the Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share 
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measures are always less than 1, misleadingly suggesting that the higher-
crime group is less intensively policed once you account for crime.88 
 If there is racial disparity in average stop rates conditional on criminal 
conduct, disfavoring the higher-crime group, Ratio/Ratio and 
Share/Share comparisons always misleadingly mask its extent. 
Specifically, both measures will always be less than a weighted average of 
the true disproportionalities in the policing of the innocent and of the 
guilty (DI and DG, as defined above).
89  They are also both either less than 
DI or less than DG, and are often less than either one;
90 these relationships 
are explored further in the next Section. In some cases, they misleadingly 
reverse the apparent direction of the disparity.91 
 If policing disparities conditional on criminal conduct disfavor the lower-
crime group, the Ratio/Ratio measure always exaggerates this disparity,92 
but the Share/Share measure is then more ambiguous. It might actually 
understate the disparity, especially if the higher-crime group is relatively 
large. This is because of the “dilution” of the Share/Share measure 
discussed above, the extent of which depends on relative group size.  
 Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share comparisons are more misleading when 
group crime-rate differences are larger. On the other hand, when there is 
no crime-rate difference, the comparisons are fine.93 
 Because the problem stems from stops of the innocent, both measures 
get more misleading when the police are less discerning between guilty 
and innocent, and when more of the population is innocent. But as the 
number of stopped innocents moves toward zero, the Ratio/Ratio 
measure converges on the stop-rate ratio among the guilty (DG). 
None of this means it‟s wrong to try to “account for crime.” But dividing by crime 
rates or shares is a bad way to account for it.  
One might wonder whether there is some other justification for using 
Share/Share or Ratio/Ratio Comparisons—some reason to care whether stop and 
crime distributions mirror one another, other than the “like cases” principle.  
Perhaps there is, but none seems obvious, and those who employ Share/Share or 
                                                 
88 See Proof 1 and all the examples in Table A1. 
89 See Proof 3 and Table A2, Cols. 1-4; the notes accompanying Table A2 and Proof 3 discuss 
several alternative means of weighting the average (the proposition is true for any of them).  Proof 3 
applies to the Ratio/Ratio measure, but he fact that the Share/Share measure is also lower than any 
weighted average of DI and DG that is greater than 1 follows from a combination of Proofs 2 and 3: if 
the Ratio/Ratio measure is (while lower) still above 1, the Share/Share measure will be lower yet, and 
if the Ratio/Ratio measure is below 1, the Share/Share measure will also be below 1. 
90 This follows from the fact that they are lower than the weighted average.  
91 See Table A2, Cols. 1-2. 
92 Again, it is always lower (in this case, farther below 1) than DI and/or DG, and lower than their 
weighted average. These points follow from Proof 3. 
93 See the last columns in Tables A1 and A2. Proofs 1, 2, and 3 all assume crime-rate differences. 
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Ratio/Ratio comparisons have not articulated any. Rather, the comparisons are 
usually presented as though they speak to the question whether like cases are being 
treated alike. And audiences are likely to interpret them that way, unless some 
alternative interpretation is clearly articulated.94 
I do not think these comparisons are deliberately misleading, though they generally 
mislead in a particular direction: reducing the appearance of overpolicing of higher-
crime groups (usually people of color).  Both comparison types are routine on both 
sides of the race-and-policing debate. They seem intuitively correct, and as research 
on other common mathematical mistakes suggests, it is remarkably easy not to notice 
when such intuitions are wrong.95 
D. Estimating Policing Burdens Conditional on Criminal Conduct  
How should researchers assess racial disparities conditional on criminal conduct, 
then? If we knew criminal conduct, race, and police interactions for the same sample 
(including those not stopped), we could directly estimate race gaps in police-
interaction rates for any given criminal conduct condition, or overall average 
disparity conditional on criminal conduct.96 This may sometimes be possible—in 
particular, it is possible for surveys that ask respondents to self-report their criminal 
conduct also to ask about policing outcomes.  A few surveys of cohorts of youth 
have done so, at least with respect to arrest outcomes and certain specific categories 
of criminal offending.  These generally ask respondents about their behavior over 
                                                 
94 If anything, these comparisons suggest an unattractive “group desert” theory—the idea that a 
group‟s total policing burden should track its total crime commission, without regard to which 
specific individuals are guilty.  Or perhaps police might argue that it‟s rational to attach extra suspicion 
to all members of high-crime groups, and to allocate stops in direct proportion to group crime rates.  
It‟s not clear that this approach would be efficient, however, and in the next Part, I argue that it‟s 
wrong and unconstitutional for the police to infer criminal propensity based on race. In any case, even 
if we identified a good reason to allocate stops in proportion to crime shares, it would still be 
important to recognize that doing so will mean people with the same conduct systematically face 
different apprehension rates depending on race.  Policymakers would have to decide whether to 
tolerate this breach of the like-cases principle in order to serve some other objective.  The literature 
that employs Share/Share and Ratio/Ratio comparisons has failed to highlight this conflict.  
95 A famous example is the Monty Hall Problem, a brainteaser with a simple but counterintuitive 
solution that people (even many mathematicians) overwhelmingly resist even after it is explained. See 
John Tierney, Behind Monty Hall‟s Doors, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1991 (describing 10,000 letters sent to a 
magazine columnist protesting her correct explanation, including many from mathematics professors).  
Humans are so bad at conditional probabilities that (according to a surprisingly large interspecies-
comparison literature) we are outperformed on numerous tests by pigeons. E.g., Walter T. Hebranson 
& Julia Schroeder, Are Birds Smarter than Mathematicians?, 124 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 1 (2013); Edmund 
Fantino et al., Teaching Pigeons to Commit Base-Rate Neglect, 16 PSYCH. SCIENCE 820, 820 (2005). 
96 For example, one could estimate a regression, such as: 
Stop = β1*Black + β2*Guilty + β3*Guilty*Black + α 
Here, β1 is the additive “black” effect for the innocent; β1 + β3 is the additive “black” effect for the 
guilty; α is the baseline for white innocents, and α + β2 is the baseline for white guilty.  The predicted 
probabilities could then be divided to obtain likelihood ratios; for example, DI = (β1 + α)/α.  A 
regression could also include indicators for many possible crime types or degrees of culpability. 
Removing the interaction terms between “black” and the crime variables would produce an overall 
average “black” effect conditional on conduct.  
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some time period (for example, whether they engaged in certain conduct “often,” 
“never,” and so forth) and their arrests over the same period.97  This approach has 
some limitations, including the general accuracy and sampling concerns about 
surveys mentioned above, plus likely heightened concerns about statistical power.98  
But well-designed, large surveys at least have the potential to allow individual-level 
estimation of policing outcome disparities conditional on self-reported conduct.99 
 In the “accounting for crime” literature, however, researchers have typically 
used police outcome data that comes from official sources, which has advantages, 
including the fact that police data usually cover the full set of police interactions of 
interest (e.g., all of a jurisdiction‟s traffic stops), rather than merely the outcomes for 
a much smaller surveyed sample. However, crime benchmarks then must come from 
some other source.  Can these kinds of benchmark comparisons be used to assess 
policing disparities conditional on criminal conduct?  And can we translate existing 
Ratio/Ratio or Share/Share comparisons into the kinds of comparisons we want? 
Each of these objectives can be accomplished, but it requires an additional key 
piece of information not usually included in benchmark-comparison studies: each 
group‟s “hit rate,” the share of those stopped who are guilty. With this information, 
we can first translate existing Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio estimates into Stop Ratios for 
the guilty: 
   
   
   
⁄
   
   
⁄
 
   
  
⁄







   
   
⁄
                 
          
           
 
As this equation shows, DG always exceeds the Ratio/Ratio measure unless the high-
crime group‟s hit rate is actually below or equal to the low-crime group‟s. If the 
crime-rate difference is substantial, this can only happen if the police are much less 
accurate vis-à-vis high-crime group members (Table 3, Col. 4 is an example). 
                                                 
97  See, e.g., David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45 
DEMOGRAPHY 55 (2008) (analyzing Chicago longitudinal survey of youth cohorts); Robert J. 
Sampson, Effect of Socioeconomic Context on Official Reaction to Juvenile Delinquency, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 876 
(1986) (discussing the Seattle Youth Survey).  In both these examples, the data were also linked to the 
study participants‟ official criminal records to check the accuracy of self-reports of arrests. Such 
surveys also contain other information about the individual, and studies that use them have generally 
analyzed a broad set of predictor variables, rather than focusing on crime and race alone. 
98  The sample size needed to estimate differences in arrest rates conditional on a given type of 
criminal conduct would be larger than the sample size needed to estimate underlying criminal conduct 
differences, because the outcome is much lower-frequency, given that the great majority of criminal 
incidents do not result in arrest. 
99 Optimally, to assess disparities among the guilty, surveys should ask the outcome of each reported 
crime incident.  The approach is best suited to crime types for which the respondent is likely to have a 
clear memory of each incident (not minor, forgettable conduct like loitering).  It would be harder to 
expect respondents to also accurately recount all their innocent conduct (for example, how many times 
they walked down the street not carrying a weapon), so similar incident-level analyses would be harder 
to conduct for overall disparities conditional on criminal conduct or for disparities among the 
innocent. However, one could model number of arrests for a particular crime type as a function of 
number of times the respondent self-reports engaging in that crime.  
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The relationship of DI, the stop-rate disparity among the innocent, to the Stop 
Ratio/Crime Ratio measure can also be calculated with the same information: 
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The “Miss Rate Ratio” is the intergroup ratio of the shares of stops that are not 
“hits,” and the Innocents Ratio is the ratio of the groups‟ innocent populations. 
Note that the “Crime Ratio/Innocents Ratio” proportion is necessarily over 1 (again, 
assuming group 1 is higher-crime). The Miss Rate Ratio is usually below 1, barring 
substantial policing-accuracy differences, but often not dramatically so; if hit rates are 
below 50%, the Miss Rate Ratio is less disproportionate than the Hit Rate Ratio.100 
But it always cuts in the opposite direction. Hence, if DG is lower than the Stop 
Ratio/Crime Ratio measure, DI must be higher (because both multipliers in the 
equation above would be above 1). Simplifying the equation: 
                   
          
               
  
The Stop Ratio and Innocents Ratio could equivalently both be replaced with ratios 
of stop rates and innocence rates (the population terms cancel).  
Alternatively, we can calculate DG and DI if we know the Stop Shares and Crime 
Shares plus the hit rates for each of two groups. The Stop Ratio and Crime Ratio can 
first be calculated from the shares,101 and then the formulas above can be applied. 
As it happens, race-specific hit rates are frequently reported in the policing-
disparity literature. Some commentators treat racial equality in hit rates as evidence 
that policing disparities have no crime justification, effectively using hit rates as a 
proxy for crime rates.102 But in reality, “reported hit rates typically exceed the range 
of plausible crime rates,”103 and the relationship between hit rates and crime rates 
could differ across races.  For example, the Table A2 examples all assume a Crime 
Ratio of 2, but the Hit Rate Ratios vary from 0.56 to 2.98. 
A recently prominent line of research interprets equal hit rates in just the 
opposite way, to imply lack of police racial bias. This approach has complicated and 
problematic assumptions, which are examined in detail in Part III. For now, note 
that equal hit rates are compatible with stark racial disparities in policing rates 
conditional on criminal conduct.104 Conversely, unequal hit rates are the inevitable 
                                                 
100 For example, suppose the black and white hit rates are 0.2 and 0.1 respectively (hit-rate ratio = 
2).  Then the miss rate ratio is 0.8/0.9, or 0.89. Low hit rates are common for investigative stops; the 
NYPD claims a hit rate of 12% for its stop-and-frisk policy (but less than 1% involve weapons). 
101 Dividing any group‟s crime share (or stop share) by any other‟s gives a ratio of crimes (or stops).  
102 E.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 79-84 (2002). 
103 R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003). 
104 The test‟s leading advocate, Nicola Persico, has long acknowledged that the predicted equilibrium 
under “unbiased” policing could, depending on various conditions, be highly “unfair.” Persico, Racial 
Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1472, 1479 (2002). 
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result of equal policing conditional on criminal conduct, if crime rates differ. These 
points are illustrated by the Hit Rate Ratios in the Appendix tables.105  
But if we have hit-rate and crime-rate information that we trust, we can use that 
information in a different way, to estimate the quantities of interest DG and DI. This 
is a big “if.” Even setting aside the crime-benchmarking challenges discussed above, 
accurate hit rates may be elusive. Hit-rate studies often use arrests to measure hits, 
but this is highly problematic. Police have broad arrest discretion, and it is 
nonsensical to assume, when assessing racial disparities in stops or searches, that 
there is no unjustified racial disparity in arrests. Nor are convictions a good “hit” 
measure—conviction depends on prosecutorial discretion and on police testimony. 
Police records of whether contraband was found could likewise be affected by 
disparities in search intensity or decisions to look the other way. 
This problem also bedevils all existing uses of “hit rates” to assess racial 
disparities in policing, however.106 If researchers do trust their hit measure, it might as 
well be employed in a theoretically sensible way.  And some hit measures may be 
reasonably reliable because police have little discretion—for example, Breathalyzers 
that automatically record results, or crimes that are so serious that police almost 
never fail to arrest. How much discretion police have will not be obvious from the 
data; researchers need a strong qualitative sense of how policing works in the context 
they are studying. When researchers doubt hit measures‟ accuracy, they can use 
assumptions about a plausible range of hit rates to estimate bounds on DG and DI. 
David Thacher, in an unpublished 2002 paper, came closest to this approach. 
Analyzing NYPD‟s stop-and-frisk policy, for each racial group, he counts all stops 
not resulting in arrests as stops of innocents, and divides that number by the total 
group population. He finds that the probabilities of an innocent person being 
stopped are 0.6% for whites, 4.2% for blacks, and 2.9% for Hispanics.107 In addition 
to assuming that arrest accurately gauges innocence, Thacher apparently assumes 
guilt rates are so negligible that the total population can substitute for the innocent 
population.  Both assumptions are likely conservative, 108  yet the disparities are 
                                                 
105 As the Table A1 examples illustrate, if the same shares of the guilty and innocent are stopped 
from each group, the group with a higher guilt rate overall must have a higher guilt rate among stops. 
Meanwhile, in Table A2, black hit rates are higher in almost every hypothetical (which the advocates 
of the “outcome test” would interpret to suggest irrational bias favoring black suspects), including in 
Columns 1-3, in which black pedestrians are actually much more heavily policed conditional on 
criminal conduct. Moreover, the hit rate ratio in Column 1 is very similar to the one in Column 5, 
even though the directions of the policing disparities are reversed. A lower black hit rate is obtained 
only when we assume policing that is far less discerning for black pedestrians (Col. 4). 
106 Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of Black-White Disparities in NYPD‟s Stop-
and-Frisk Program, Working Paper (2013), 13-14, acknowledge this problem, but argue that there is no 
evidence police use arrest discretion in racially disparate ways, because arrest rates are uncorrelated by 
race after controlling for “crime type” recorded on post-stop forms. This does not help. What the 
officer writes down is discretionary, and could be a post hoc rationalization. 
107 Thacher, supra note 35, at 37 tbl. 1. 
108 The use of arrest to measure hits is conservative if arrest disparities run in the same direction as 
stop disparities; the use of the whole population to substitute for innocents is conservative assuming 
(as NYPD has contended) that black New Yorkers have a higher crime rate. 
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dramatic. The stop-and-frisk policy doesn‟t look good in terms of disparity in 
burdens on the innocent. 
But what about disparities affecting the guilty? Thacher does not address this 
question for stop-and-frisk, perhaps because doing so would require crime 
benchmarks. One cannot simply assume away the existence of the guilty population 
when evaluating their stop probabilities. Instead, Thacher praises Lamberth‟s 
Turnpike study for having “properly estimated the distribution of burdens on the 
guilty.”109 Is this praise merited? Well, recall that Lamberth found that virtually all 
drivers were guilty of (minimal) speeding; if minimal speeding is the proper measure 
of “guilt” (which has been sharply contested), then there would be very few stops of 
the innocent, so the problems outlined in the previous section wouldn‟t emerge.110 
But Thacher does not explain how disparities affecting the guilty should be estimated 
when guilt is less universal, nor how disparities affecting the innocent should be 
estimated when guilt rates are nontrivial. 
Both, however, can be estimated, albeit not easily.  When we lack either a good 
crime benchmark or a good hit measure, the best we may be able to do is to offer a 
reasonable range of estimates based on assumptions. But even if the questions posed 
by the “like cases” framework are empirically challenging, they are the right questions 
if we want to “account for crime” in a normatively meaningful way.  
III. Measuring Racial Discrimination in Police Decision-Making 
What if we want to go beyond asking whether policing disparities are explained 
by crime commission, and instead ask whether they are driven by racial 
discrimination? This Part assesses this question, beginning by asking why it is 
constitutionally central and morally important. Section B examines causal inference 
problems that complicate the task. Section C considers the literature‟s main 
approaches: the “hit-rate” test, regression studies of stops and post-stop outcomes, 
studies exploiting variations in ability to observe race, and lab studies of implicit 
biases. Finally, Section D argues for a new strategy—the use of “testers,” like those 
used in other antidiscrimination enforcement and research contexts—and addresses 
how to address practical, safety, and ethical concerns specific to the policing context. 
 A. The Constitutional and Moral Case Against Racial Profiling 
While many causes of policing disparity raise policy concerns, the role of 
governmental discrimination is the key question posed by equal protection doctrine. 
Current doctrine precludes constitutional challenges solely premised on racially 
disparate impact111 or discrimination by private actors like witnesses.112 But, as I show 
                                                 
109 Id. at 24. 
110 Lamberth actually divided each group‟s stop share by its share of all drivers on the road.  If 
almost everyone is guilty, this is close to a Stop Share/Crime Share comparison.  
111 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).  
112 One could argue that when the police give effect to such private discrimination by carrying out 
stops and arrests, state action is generated. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (barring judicial 
enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants).  But doctrinally, this is likely a nonstarter. See 
Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2006) (dismissing a similar hypothetical 
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here, police racial discrimination essentially always violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. It is, however, difficult to prove, which makes effective empirical strategies 
especially important—for parties to litigation, for courts, for Congress should it 
legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment, and for police departments who wish to 
comply with the Constitution and avoid litigation. Moreover, the disparate treatment 
question matters for other normative reasons as well. 
Although there is a strong scholarly consensus that racial profiling should be 
considered unconstitutional, scholars often question whether the Supreme Court 
agrees.  Many have critiqued the Court for leaving the door open to police reliance 
on race.113 These critics have grounds for frustration: the Court has avoided squarely 
deciding the Fourteenth Amendment issue and has meanwhile foreclosed Fourth 
Amendment strategies.  Moreover, lower courts have been unwilling to second-guess 
police reliance on race-specific suspect identifications, even in extreme cases.114 Still, 
broader equal protection doctrine leaves little ambiguity.  Racial profiling (by which I 
mean reliance on conscious or subconscious racial generalizations about criminality, 
as opposed to specific suspect identifications) clearly violates the Equal Protection 
Clause as the Court has consistently interpreted it.115 
Scholars examining the relevant constitutional doctrine have mainly focused on 
the Court‟s numerous adverse Fourth Amendment precedents. 116  These include 
Whren v. United States, holding that a traffic stop provides probable cause for a vehicle 
search even if the traffic violation was a mere pretext,117 and United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, which suggested that Mexican appearance might provide reasonable suspicion 
                                                                                                                                     
extension of Shelley); David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
935, 966-83 (1989) (reviewing post-Shelley doctrine). It would also set a difficult standard for police, 
who may not know when witnesses are racially biased.  
113 E.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 1006; Delores Jones-Brown & Brian A. Maule, Racially Biased 
Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 141-43; Paulaumus et al., supra note 43, 
at 242-43; Evan Gerstman & Christopher Shortell, The Many Faces of Strict Scrutiny, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1, 46-50 (2001); Alschuler, supra note 27, at 164-66; Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 425, 442-43 (1997). 
114 Notoriously, in Brown et al. v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2000), the Second Circuit upheld the 
interrogation of 200 black men based on a white victim‟s description of a black male assailant. For 
critiques, see Gerstman & Shortell, supra note 113, at 47; Alschuler, supra note 27, at 179-92. Oneonta‟s 
facts were shocking; one can hardly imagine a race-reversed scenario in which 200 white men were 
stopped. But plaintiffs do not win equal protection cases based on what one can and can‟t imagine, 
even if sometimes they should. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (requiring an actual 
comparison group). Broad sweeps like this may still be attacked for lack of Fourth Amendment 
individualized suspicion; the court in Oneonta allowed that argument to proceed. 221 F.3d at 334. In 
any event, courts consistently distinguish racially specific suspect descriptions from behavioral 
generalizations about groups. See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal 
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1078-80 (2001) (critiquing this distinction). 
115 The Sixth Circuit has gotten this issue wrong, however. E.g., United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 
174 (1995); see Alschuler, supra note 27, at 178-79 (critiquing these cases). 
116 E.g., Jones-Brown & Maule, supra note 113, at 140-57; Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and 
Broken Windows Revisited, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 312-13; Johnson, supra 
note 5, at 1006-08. 
117 517 U.S. 806, 813-16 (1996).  
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of an immigration violation when combined with other factors, but not alone.118 But 
these cases do not implicate equal protection claims. Brignoni-Ponce sent a confusing 
signal (why suggest that ethnicity may be relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis if 
its consideration is barred by the Fourteenth?), but it does not trump the many equal 
protection cases striking down decision-makers‟ use of race even alongside other 
factors. 119  Many scholars have critiqued the doctrinal separation of Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment objections to racial profiling,120 but its upside is that adverse 
holdings on the former do not preclude the latter.121 
The Supreme Court has never decided whether racial profiling violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but to say no, it would have to upend decades of doctrine. 
The key line of cases concerns the prohibition on “statistical discrimination.” The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that otherwise-impermissible discrimination 
cannot be justified based on group generalizations, even if those generalizations are 
empirically accurate. Instead, individuals must be treated as individuals.122  
For example, in Craig v. Boren, the Court struck down a law applying different 
drinking ages to men and women. It was unmoved by studies showing that young 
men drove drunk at ten times the rate of young women, because these findings 
lumped all young men together. 123  Similarly, the Court has struck down 
governmental reliance on gendered or racial generalizations about learning styles,124 
juror voting,125 and workforce participation.126 All these generalizations had statistical 
support, but the Court made clear that this doesn‟t matter: basing disparate treatment 
on groups‟ typical tendencies is unfair to atypical individuals. The Court has carved 
out exceptions only for physical sex differences relating to pregnancy.127 It has never 
made exceptions for generalizations about behavior, and it would be shocking if it 
did so for racial generalizations about criminal tendencies. 
                                                 
118 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975); see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
119 E.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); see 
Gross & Barnes, supra note 11, at 740.  
120 E.g., Alschuler, supra note 27, at 193 (reviewing commentary); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, 
Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 309-29 (1997). 
121 Scholars have suggested that Whren and related cases green-light racial profiling in car searches. 
See Jones-Brown & Maule, supra, at 153-57 (also citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) and 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)); Paulhaumus et al., supra note 43, at 242-43; Fagan et 
al., supra note 116, at 312. This is likely often true in practice, because allowing pretextual justifications 
makes it harder to prove racial discrimination. But Whren did not suggest it would be legal to rely on 
race—it suggested otherwise. 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally 
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment”). 
122 See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 803, 823-29 (2014) (analyzing these cases). 
123 429 U.S. 190, 202-04 (1976). 
124 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996). 
125 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90, 
97-98 (1986). 
126 See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
690-91 (1973). 
127 See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001). 
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This line of cases should be fatal to any attempt to justify racial profiling by 
arguing that profiles are empirically supported. This is so even assuming crime 
prevention is a compelling state interest.128 In none of the cases reviewed above did 
the Court assess whether the statistical generalization in question established an 
important government interest. Rather, the prohibition on statistical discrimination is 
best understood to constrain the kinds of reasoning that the government can offer to 
establish its interest. Otherwise, the law in Boren might well have survived scrutiny, 
for example. The government clearly has an important interest in preventing drunk 
driving—yet it was barred from using statistical evidence to show a relationship 
between that interest and the gender classification. 
Moreover, law enforcement bodies have generally agreed that profiling is illegal. 
For example, in 2003 DOJ declared it “absolutely prohibited.” 129  The remaining 
ambiguity in the case law may therefore be irrelevant in practice. Modern police 
departments don‟t defend racial profiling. They deny that they engage in it.130 Most 
profiling lawsuits have settled on terms prohibiting it.131 
But if the Fourteenth Amendment argument is doctrinally well supported and 
not in practice contested, why has the Fourth Amendment played a more prominent 
role in profiling litigation? The key problem is evidentiary: it‟s hard for litigants to 
prove racial profiling, and especially to prove that it affected any specific case.132 
Individual criminal defendants raising selective-enforcement defenses face very steep 
hurdles.133 In federal criminal cases, even getting discovery on the issue is notoriously 
difficult.134 And even if defendants can show a pattern of discrimination, they must 
                                                 
128 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (listing prohibition on gender generalizations 
and a substantial relationship to important government interests as separate requirements).  
129  U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: RACIAL PROFILING 3 (2003), 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf. 
130 E.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing Arizona sheriff‟s defense to 
equal protection suit: “Defendants do not engage in racial profiling”); News Hour with Jim Lehrer, 
Aug. 13, 2013 (quoting NYPD Commissioner: “We do not engage in racial profiling. It is prohibited 
by law [and] by our own regulations.”); Sho Wills, Chicago, New York Officers Spar Over Stop-and-Frisk 
Policy, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/14/us/new-york-chicago-stop-frisk/ (Aug. 14, 2014) 
(quoting Chicago PD spokesman); Greg Risling, DOJ Finds Two LA Sheriff‟s Stations Discriminating, 
ASSOC. PRESS (June 28, 2013) (describing L.A. County Sheriffs‟ response to DOJ investigation); All 
Police to Attend Racial Profiling Class, BURLINGTON CNTY. TIMES (June 29, 2005) (stating that all New 
Jersey police officers must attend training teaching unconstitutionality of profiling); Jane Prendergast, 
Officers' Hearts Hold Racial Profiling Solution, Chief Says, CIN. ENQUIRER (Mar. 6, 2011) (quoting 
Cincinnati police chief: Profiling “is not only wrong, it's unconstitutional. It's illegal. We know that. 
We teach that.”); Letter from S.C. Kitchen to Assistant U.S. Attorney General Thomas E. Perez, 
(September 26, 2013), http://www.timesnewshosting.com/docs/johnson.pdf (denying profiling).  
131 See Gross & Barnes, supra note 11, at 741-43. 
132 See id. at 653-57, 741; David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 296, 322-29 (2001); Johnson, supra note 5, at 1063-64. 
133 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 354 (“Research has uncovered no cases” of convictions 
overturned for selective prosecution, as of 1997). 
134 The Supreme Court has required “some evidence” of “differential treatment of similarly situated 
members of other races.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465-67. Identifying a “similarly situated” group is 
notoriously difficult, and may be more so in policing cases: police keep no “records of instances in 
which they could have stopped a motorist…but did not.” Davis, supra note 113, at 437-38. 
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also show that it affected their cases specifically. Statistical evidence about broader 
patterns almost never clears this hurdle alone, though it might help in combination 
with case-specific qualitative evidence.135  For these reasons, the best prospects for 
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to succeed are in civil cases (class actions or 
government enforcement actions), in which the pattern of discrimination is the issue.  
Such cases turn centrally on statistical evidence. 
Some commentators, while acknowledging the legal importance of the disparate-
treatment question, have dismissed its moral importance. Thacher, for example, 
describes the focus on “racial profiling” as a parochial concern of lawyers—a 
distraction from “substantive” equality. 136  In fact, however, this call for a move 
beyond colorblindness echoes a view that has long been common in legal scholarship 
beyond the policing context: that equality law should primarily target group 
subordination, not forbidden classifications.137  
I generally sympathize with this antisubordination view. But whether the police 
racially discriminate is not “merely” a legalistic concern. Racially disparate treatment 
adds a substantively meaningful dimension of harm. Critics of racial disparities in 
policing (not just lawyers) have emphasized the role of discrimination, “racial 
profiling,” or just “racism.”138 This framing has cultural resonance and moral force.139 
For the government to generalize that people of color are dangerous, and to 
specifically target them for surveillance and arrest, is expressively and morally 
noxious, especially because such generalizations have a painful history in our 
culture.140 I am not suggesting that one should not acknowledge racial differences in 
crime rates. But the poisonous aspect is using those differences to justify ignoring 
differences within groups, making law-abiding citizens “pay for fears generated by 
criminals with which they are lumped by dint of color.”141  
                                                 
135 In principle, strong statistical evidence could allow an inference that the defendant probably would 
not have been stopped but for race.  But courts have resisted this sort of reasoning, see Harcourt, supra 
note 13, at 1278, just as they are often uncomfortable inferring individual causation from statistics in 
other kinds of cases, see Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1349-51 (1971). In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Court refused 
to allow a defendant‟s challenge to his capital sentence to rest solely on statistical findings of racial 
disparity in death penalty administration. This holding emphasized deference to prosecutors and 
juries, and could possibly be distinguished in a challenge to police racial profiling; the Court has 
upheld equal protection claims based on statistical evidence in some other criminal-law contexts. E.g., 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).  
136 Thacher, supra note 35, at 26; see supra note 40 (addressing other critics of discrimination focus).  
137  E.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003). 
138 E.g., The Targeting of Young Blacks by Law Enforcement: Ben Jealous in Conversation with Jamelle Bouie, 
AM. PROSPECT, Fall 2014; Rockeymoore et al, supra note 3; Statement of Rep. John Lewis, 
http://johnlewis.house.gov/press-release/rep-john-lewis-shooting-michael-brown-and-events-
ferguson-missouri. 
139 See BLANK ET AL., supra note 84, at 103 (stating more generally that “the broader public vision of 
what discrimination means [is] the treatment of two (nearly) identical people differently”). 
140 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 16; Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger, 42 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1987); Barack Obama, Remarks on Trayvon Martin, July 19, 2013. 
141 KENNEDY, supra note 30, at xi. 
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The harms of racially disparate policing are thus often substantially connected to 
racial targeting, not just to police interactions per se. Perceptions of police racism also 
deeply undercut trust in the police in black communities, which may undermine 
police effectiveness. 142   In short, racial discrimination may be just one morally 
troubling cause of racial disparity, but it‟s an important one. 
B. Race and the Problem of Causal Inference  
Identifying the effects of racial discrimination is even harder than assessing racial 
disparities in policing of people with like criminal conduct.  The latter inquiry need 
not involve causal claims; the racial discrimination question does.143 Answering it 
requires researchers to disentangle not only the role of crime but also all other 
potentially confounding variables. This is challenging, because race is not a 
“treatment” subject to manipulation. Its effects are intertwined with each individual‟s 
other attributes and life experiences—which may themselves have been influenced 
by race. Scholars have therefore debated whether the language of causal inference 
can be meaningfully applied to race at all.144 Perhaps we can‟t sensibly ask how a 
person‟s outcome would have differed but for her race if her entire life would have 
been different in that counterfactual. 
This conceptual hurdle is not insuperable, however. Usually, when we ask causal 
questions about race (“Do police officers stop more African-Americans because of 
their race?”), we‟re not asking about race‟s total, lifelong effects, but about racial 
discrimination in a particular decision process. 145  The counterfactual is how the 
decision-maker would have responded if she had instead encountered another 
person of a different race but otherwise similar relevant characteristics. James 
Greiner and Donald Rubin have suggested referring to “perceived race” to highlight 
this point.146 In my view, while the point is sound, there‟s little harm in the shorthand 
“effect of race,” provided we are clear on what it means.147 
But isolating “effects of race” even in this narrower sense is difficult. It is not 
just that race resists experimental manipulation; for any given individual, it does not 
vary naturally either. Immutable traits defy observational researchers‟ best tools for 
causal inference, such as panel designs (which follow individuals before and after a 
treatment) or quasi-experiments exploiting shocks to a treatment. 148  Instead, 
                                                 
142 See id. at 151-53; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation, in RACE, ETHNICITY, 
AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 102-04; Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 2, at 1017-18. 
143  See, e.g., Lincoln Quillian, New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination, 32 
ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 299, 302 (defining “discrimination” as “the causal effect of race”). 
144 D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable Characteristics, 93 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 775, 783-84 (2011); Maya Sen & Omar Wasow, Reconciling Race and Causation (2014), 
https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Wasow04092014/race_causation_4.pdf. 
145 If one did want to examine “the effect of dynamic, cumulative discrimination,” BLANK ET AL., 
supra note 84, at 226, the strategies discussed here wouldn‟t much help; raw disparity estimates might. 
146 Greiner & Rubin, supra note 144, at 775. 
147 “Effect of perceived race” is itself a shorthand; every individual has been affected by perceptions 
of her race her whole life. 
148 Quasi-experimental designs can be used to assess changes or differences in racial disparity. See, 
e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013) 
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researchers must use methods—such as regression, reweighting, and matching—that 
share a core limitation: their ability to support causal inferences depends on the 
ability to observe the potentially confounding variables.149 Because one can never 
really exclude the possibility of omitted variables, careful researchers often refer to 
the race gaps that remain after controlling for observed variables simply as 
“unexplained,” rather than claiming proof of discrimination.150  
Still, neither policy analysis nor law requires definitive answers. For policy 
purposes, strong causal identification would be great, but even an analysis with 
weaker identification can usefully narrow down the possibilities; theoretically 
informed discussion can then guide interpretation of unexplained gaps. In civil 
litigation, the traditional burden of proof requires that the factfinder believe the best 
interpretation of the evidence is that discrimination probably had some effect. After 
all, non-statistical evidence of causation (and other contested facts) is often also open 
to multiple interpretations. While courts have sometimes demanded more clarity out 
of statistical evidence, certainty or even near-certainty is too much to ask for.151 
Moreover (though there is no clear doctrine on this), it should be unnecessary to rule 
out every theoretically possible confounding variable in order to support an equal 
protection claim.  Instead, the key question should be whether the explanations for 
disparities that the police department gives hold up.152 
In the remainder of this discussion, I assume that strong causal identification is 
the ideal goal of research on police racial discrimination.  However, I also examine 
what we can learn from observational research that falls somewhat short of this goal. 
C. Current Methods of Measuring Police Racial Discrimination 
How might one isolate the effects of police racial discrimination? In this Section, 
I consider several approaches from the literature: the “hit-rate” test, neighborhood-
level studies of initial stops, studies of post-stop decisions, studies exploiting 
variations in decision-makers‟ information about race, and lab experiments on 
                                                                                                                                     
(using regression discontinuity design); David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in their Treatment of Race?, 
41 J. LEGAL STUDIES 347 (2012) (exploiting random assignment of judges).  
149 Regression models express some functional relationship between variables; the function is fit to 
data to solve for its parameters, identifying each covariate‟s association with the outcome when the 
others are held constant. Reweighting and matching are methods of rendering groups comparable in 
characteristics before comparing their outcomes. 
150 See, e.g., Quillian, supra note 143, at 303. 
151 The case that set the hardest standard was McCleskey, in which the Supreme Court, invoking 
deference to prosecutors and jurors, held that “exceptionally clear proof” of discrimination was 
required to support a challenge to the death penalty. But it is not obvious that McCleskey‟s reasoning 
applies to policing at all, see supra note 135, or that it applies to civil lawsuits alleging a pattern of 
discrimination. McCleskey (and every federal appellate case following it) centers on the problem of 
inferring discrimination in an individual criminal case from a broader statistical pattern. 
152  In petit and grand jury discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has required the state to 
articulate reasons for its decisions and “stand or fall on the plausibility” of those reasons. Miller-El v. 
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005); see Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1970) (holding that 
this burden-shifting can be triggered by statistical evidence of disparate impact); see also McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing similar requirement in Title VII cases).  
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implicit biases. While I do not return to the crime-benchmark comparisons 
addressed in Part II, such comparisons have also often been presented as methods 
for assessing “racial profiling”—implying that if crime differences do not explain 
policing differences, racial discrimination does.153 This inference could be reasonable, 
but only absent plausible alternative explanations.154  
1. The Hit-Rate Test 
In recent years, the most prominent strategy for causal inference about race and 
policing has been the hit-rate test.155 In Part II.D, I showed briefly that this test does 
not address equality in policing conditional on criminal conduct. Here, I show that it 
also fails to identify racial discrimination—or anything we likely want to know. 
The method posits that unbiased police seek to maximize the probability of 
detecting crime, and thus shift their attention toward groups with higher “hit 
rates.”156 Those groups then reduce their crime rates, which leads to police stopping 
them less, and so forth. At equilibrium, all groups have the same hit rates (and crime 
rates). On this view, unequal hit rates suggest racial bias: police who fail to shift stops 
to the higher-rate group must irrationally prefer to stop the other group.157 Equal hit 
rates suggest no bias. 158  The underlying theory distinguishes “taste-based” 
discrimination (prejudice) from statistical discrimination (use of race as a proxy for a 
legitimate consideration). Economists sometimes defend the latter as efficient.159 
But even if it is, it wouldn‟t render racial discrimination constitutional. As the 
previous Section outlined, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the 
distinction between taste-based and statistical discrimination: it is no defense that 
police were “correct” to consider race. And the model‟s vision of “unbiased” 
policing does not merely allow unconstitutional statistical discrimination—it requires it. 
Unbiased police are expected to track hit rates by race and to target high-rate racial 
groups until rates equalize. Failure to do so is interpreted as irrational bias against the 
                                                 
153 For example, the various Turnpike studies were designed to test racial profiling allegations. 
154 For instance, perhaps highway troopers are not able to observe much besides speed and race. 
155 See Engel, supra note 40, at 16 (describing this test as “the analytical strategy of choice [for] many 
researchers, police administrators, court officials, citizen groups, and other stakeholders”). 
156 The seminal paper is John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 
109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001); see also Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Generalizing the Hit Rates Test for 
Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, with an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita, 116 ECON. J. F351 (2006); 
Ruben Hernández-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate 
Data, 45 INT'L ECON. REV. 959 (2004); Persico, supra note 104. 
157 E.g., Hernández-Murillo & Knowles, supra note 156, at 959; Sean Childers, Note, Discrimination 
During Traffic Stops, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1025 , 1041 (2012).   
158 E.g., Persico & Todd, supra, at F361; Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial 
Profiling, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163, 171-72 (2009); Joseph A. Schafer et al., Decision-making in Traffic 
Stop Encounters, 9 POLICE Q. 184, 200 (2006). 
159 See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REV. 
659 (1972). Economists have debated the conditions under which statistical discrimination is efficient. 
E.g., Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228 (1986); Peter 
Norman, Statistical Discrimination and Efficiency, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 615 (2003).  
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lower-rate group. It would thus be wholly inappropriate for courts to use the 
approach to test for unconstitutional discrimination, as some propose.160 
The approach is also unsatisfying on policy grounds: it in fact tests neither 
equality nor efficiency.  As to equality, the test embraces race-based policing and 
toxic racial generalizations about criminality, and as discussed in Part II, equal hit 
rates are completely consistent with stark differences in treatment of those with the 
same criminal conduct.  As to efficiency, the test does not speak to whether police 
are minimizing crime, much less maximizing total social utility.  Rather, under strong 
assumptions, it measures whether police maximize arrests.  Maximizing arrests and 
minimizing crime are not synonymous. A race-conscious crime-minimization 
strategy would have to focus not on hit rates, but on responsiveness to policing. As 
Bernard Harcourt has shown, policing that targets higher-crime groups can increase 
net crime if those groups respond less favorably to police presence.161  
Indeed, some of the test‟s leading proponents have acknowledged this point, but 
have argued that officers‟ career incentives favor maximizing arrests, not reducing 
crime, so from their perspective, maximizing hit rates is rational.162 Descriptively, this 
could be right. But why should researchers or policymakers share this objective? 
Essentially, the hit-rate model tests whether officers are racially discriminating in a 
way that serves their career goals, and not in other ways that do not. A police 
department that “passes” that test should hardly be proud of it. 
Even as a test of whether police maximize arrests, the approach may tell us little, 
because it relies on extremely strong and dubious assumptions. First, it assumes the 
hit measure is itself untainted by discrimination, a problem discussed in Part II. 
Second, it assumes police accurately track hit rates by race and shift stop patterns 
accordingly. This is probably rarely true.163 Third, the model assumes that potential 
criminals know their stop probabilities, update that information when the police shift 
stop patterns, and change their behavior accordingly. But potential criminals actually 
face highly ambiguous information about detection rates,164 and when those rates 
change, they often don‟t adjust their behavior proportionally.165 Fourth, the model 
also assumes officers simultaneously track hit-rate differences across all other 
characteristics and behaviors that they observe and adjust stop rates accordingly, and 
                                                 
160 Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F.Supp.2d 417, 450-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing NYPD‟s 
argument); Nicola Persico & David A. Castleman, Detecting Bias: Using Statistical Evidence to Establish 
Intentional Discrimination in Racial Profiling Cases, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 233 (2005). Others have 
correctly responded that taste-based discrimination is only one subset of disparate treatment. E.g., Ian 
Ayres, Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation, 48 PERSP. IN BIOL. & 
MED. S68, S80 (2005). Engel, supra note 40, at 3, puzzlingly equates statistical discrimination to 
disparate impact discrimination; it is disparate treatment. 
161 Harcourt, supra note 13, at 1296-1307. 
162 Persico, supra note 104, at 1473-74; Coviello & Persico, supra note 106, at 6-11 (explaining that 
the test doesn‟t work for allocation of police among precincts, which likely does aim to reduce crime). 
163
 Only recently have some departments tracked stops and searches by race, and it‟s unlikely that 
officers regularly check these figures and understand how to interpret them. 
164 See Thomas A. Loughran, On Ambiguity in Risk Perceptions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 1029 (2011); Lance 
Lochner, Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System, NBER Working Paper 9474, at 1 (2006). 
165 Lochner, supra note 164, at 29; see also Engel, supra note 40, at 25 (raising a similar criticism). 
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that individuals respond such that equal-hit-rate equilibria are produced across all 
those characteristics and behaviors. This assumption is crucial to solving the 
“inframarginality problem” that would otherwise invalidate the model.166  
In addition, the model does not overcome the key problem of omitted variable 
bias. The discrimination being measured could be a “taste” for an unobserved race-
correlated trait, not race itself.167 Finally, the model predicts that each group‟s hit rate 
will equal its crime rate, 168 but this is demonstrably false: observed hit rates often 
vastly exceed plausible underlying crime rates.169 
In short, the hit-rate approach has little but mathematical elegance to 
recommend it. Several of the concerns raised here have been raised by others and 
conceded by the model‟s creators—but these concessions are quite serious, and go to 
the heart of whether we should trust the model. The test‟s continued prevalence is 
puzzling, and presumably stems from the perceived absence of viable alternatives.170 
But in my view, several of the approaches reviewed below are superior despite their 
limitations; and in Section D, I propose a new alternative. 
2. Neighborhood-Level Studies of Stop Probability 
Again, for the most part we lack individual-level, general-population data about 
underlying criminal conduct, a problem for studies of initial stop probability. It might 
be possible to construct data sources (especially self-report surveys) that include 
crime information, stop information, and other potential confounding variables; the 
self-report surveys discussed in the previous Part have focused on arrests.  For now, 
however, regression studies of initial stop probability have generally focused on 
neighborhood- or precinct-level disparities, there are plausible crime benchmarks 
available. Researchers can study whether police appear to be treating minority 
                                                 
166 This is why the hit-rate model has to be so complicated. One might have imagined a simpler 
statistical-discrimination story: police are rational Bayesians who interpret signals of “suspiciousness” 
in light of race-specific base rates and apply a lower suspiciousness bar for stopping one race than 
another. But whether the police have lowered the bar rationally—such that the marginal cases for each 
rate have the same hit rates—cannot be tested empirically by comparing average hit rates, which are 
calculated based on the whole group. Unfortunately, the data don‟t tell us which cases were on the 
margin. Knowles et al.‟s model solves this problem by assuming hit rates equalize across all the other 
traits or behaviors that police observe—so at equilibrium, these traits tell police nothing, and all 
individuals are equally suspicious; all are marginal. See Knowles et al., supra note 156, at 209-12.  
167 It is often said, even by critics, that the model‟s main advantage is that it avoids omitted variable 
bias.  See, e.g., Childers, supra note 157, at 1033-35; Engel, supra note 40, at 16; Ayres, supra, at S79.  This 
is a strange claim, because the model cannot empirically distinguish between racial discrimination and 
discrimination based on unobserved race-correlated traits; it assumes away the latter.  
168 See Coviello & Persico, supra note 106, at Appendix 11. This is a consequence of the equilibria 
assumed across all other traits; see supra note 166. When NYPD argues both that stop-and-frisk hit rates 
are equal across races, Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 450-53, and that crime rates are not, id. at 584, it is 
contradicting itself.  If both facts are true, the hit-rate model‟s assumptions are not. See Persico, supra 
note 104, at 1473 (“At equilibrium it cannot be that one group has a lower fraction of criminals.”). 
169 See Banks, supra note 103, at 583; Harcourt, supra, at 1307-08. NYPD‟s stop-and-frisk program 
may be an exception; see supra note 87. 
170 Some suggest that the model‟s estimate of “taste-based” discrimination is a useful lower bound for 
unconstitutional discrimination. E.g., Childers, supra note 157, at 1028. But the model‟s problematic 
assumptions and the omitted variable bias problem threaten the “lower bound” interpretation as well. 
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neighborhoods differently, and control for reported neighborhood crime and other 
neighborhood characteristics. Such studies cannot assess the effect of individual race 
on stops. But they represent the best current strategy for assessing whether 
neighborhoods are treated differently based on race.  
A good example is the analysis of precinct-level disparities presented in the 
report of the plaintiffs‟ expert, Jeffrey Fagan, in the Floyd stop-and-frisk litigation.171  
Fagan‟s analysis regressed precinct stop rates on various racial groups‟ population 
share; controls included crime complaints the previous quarter, neighborhood 
socioeconomic and other demographic characteristics, and size of the precinct‟s 
police force.172  The report found that black and Hispanic population share strongly 
predicted stop rates,173 and the district court agreed.174  
Crime rate controls in regressions could, in principle, could raise concerns like 
those explored in Part II. A neighborhood‟s stop rate incorporates stops of the guilty 
and the innocent, so we shouldn‟t expect it to be proportional to the neighborhood 
crime rate if individuals are stopped at equal rates across neighborhoods conditional 
on criminal conduct.175 But our focus in this Part is whether the police are racially 
discriminating, not whether individuals with like conduct are being treated alike, so it 
makes sense to control for other factors that the police are taking into account.  And 
when a department is making inter-neighborhood police allocation decisions, it very 
likely does consider neighborhood crime rates.176  
Neighborhood regressions are affected by two other by-now-familiar problems: 
limited crime data and omitted variable bias. So researchers need to consider their 
crime benchmarks carefully, and should not claim to have “proven” discrimination 
or its absence decisively (although, again, results need not have a definitive causal 
interpretation to be useful).  
3. Individual-Level Studies of Post-Stop Decisions 
Some studies focus on disparities in searches, arrests, or other sanctions among 
stopped persons, controlling for other defendant and neighborhood characteristics 
and sometimes for the stop justification recorded by the officer. 177  Beyond the 
                                                 
171 Floyd v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034, Report of Jeffrey Fagan 30-34. 
172 Id. The force size control means that the model does not test discrimination in allocation of police 
among precincts. An alternative model omitted this control, and estimated larger race gaps. Id. at 36. 
173 Id. at 32-34. The magnitudes suggest that moving from an entirely white neighborhood to an 
entirely black or Hispanic neighborhood would, other factors equal, nearly double the stop rate. 
The plaintiffs‟ additional multilevel models assessed racial disparities within precincts as well. Id. 
at 40-45. These models do not have individual-level controls for criminal conduct or other possible 
individual-level confounders, which is a weakness from a causal inference perspective. On the other 
hand, if NYPD really was stopping people essentially at random, crime controls may have been 
unnecessary, for reasons discussed supra note 87.   
174 Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 560. 
175  The math is not identical, because here the regressions include more variables and vary in 
functional form; many don‟t model the relationship between variables as a likelihood ratio. 
176 One cannot similarly defend race-specific neighborhood crime controls, which the NYPD argued 
for in certain analyses in Floyd.  959 F.Supp.2d at 584. Reliance on overall neighborhood crime rates is 
unconstitutional; reliance on race-specific group generalizations is not. 
177 E.g., Pickerill et al., supra note 40, at 9-19; Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 6, at 196; Greg 
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general omitted variable concern, the major limitations parallel those of studies of 
the post-arrest process, discussed in Part I.A: sample selection and post-treatment-
control problems stemming from possible racial bias in the stop decision.  When 
studying possible post-stop discrimination, one can‟t just assume that the stop 
decision by the same officer was unbiased.  This is the mirror image of one of the 
problems discussed above with hit-rate studies, which instead assume that post-stop 
outcomes are objective measures of whether the stop was valid. 
For example, consider Smith and Petrocelli‟s study of Richmond traffic stops. 
After controlling for officer and defendant traits and the stop location‟s crime rate, 
they found that among those stopped, minority drivers were substantially less likely to 
be ticketed or arrested.178 What does that finding mean? The authors acknowledge 
the ambiguity, offering two possible interpretations: that the police avoided 
sanctioning minorities because they knew they were being studied, or that they 
sanctioned them less often because more of them had been unjustifiably stopped (an 
interpretation that shares the intuition of the hit-rate studies).  Notice that these 
interpretations support opposite conclusions about the direction of discrimination.  
One solution to challenges like this is to combine analyses of post-stop outcomes 
with analyses of stop disparities, allowing estimates of unexplained post-stop 
disparities to be corrected for sample selection due to disparate stops.179 But this is 
only viable when there is a sound method available for analyzing stops. 
The literature on post-stop disparities also illustrates the importance and 
difficulty of choosing the right control variables.  Again, we see more variations on a 
by-now familiar theme: researchers often estimate biases in police decisions while 
assuming that other police decisions are unbiased. For example, analyses of search 
rates often control for whether the individual is arrested or otherwise sanctioned.180 
The apparent rationale is that arrests and sanctions reflect conduct differences, 
and/or that searches incident to arrest are not discretionary.  But arrest and sanction 
decisions are themselves discretionary (and thus potentially discriminatory). 181 
Moreover, some arrests result from searches, not vice-versa, and some arrests may be 
motivated by the desire to carry out a search incident to arrest. When studying search 
decisions, it‟s inappropriate to control for something that‟s itself an outcome of the 
search decision; doing so likely biases disparity estimates downward. 
More difficult dilemmas are posed by efforts to control for behavior as recorded 
                                                                                                                                     
Ridgeway, Assessing the Effect of Race Bias in Post-Traffic Stop Outcomes Using Propensity Scores, 22 J. QUANT. 
CRIM. 1 (2006). 
178 Smith & Petrocelli, supra note 4, at 19-20. 
179  For example, two studies have compared traffic stop rates to violation rates measured via 
physical observation, then analyzed post-stop outcomes. See Engel et al., supra note 60, at 157 (finding 
that black and Hispanic drivers faced triple whites‟ search probability); Alpert et al., supra note 61, at 
47 (finding no search-probability difference).  Neither study‟s post-stop analysis corrected for sample 
selection, though in Alpert et al.‟s study, this made sense because no stop disparity was found.  Both 
studies‟ analyses of stop disparities are subject to the interpretive concerns raised in Part II. 
180 See e.g., Alpert et al., supra note 61, at 47 (arrest); Pickerill et al., supra note 40, at 9-19 (citations).  
181 Likewise, it is misleading to refer to searches incident to arrest as “low-discretion” searches, e.g., 
Pickerill et al., supra note 40, at 15, given that the arrest decision itself is highly discretionary.   
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by officers. For example, a Cleveland study found that officers more often described 
black drivers as noncompliant or disrespectful; arrest disparities disappeared after 
controlling for these descriptions.182 The RAND study of NYPD‟s frisk, search, and 
sanction rates similarly controlled for “evasiveness, … appearing to be casing, acting 
as a lookout, wearing clothes consistent with those commonly used in crime, making 
furtive movements, acting in a manner consistent with a drug transaction or a violent 
crime, or having a suspicious bulge.”183 But officers‟ descriptions of these traits could 
be affected by race, or by the search or sanction decision itself (they could be post 
hoc justifications). These control variables could thus filter out part of what 
researchers are trying to measure. Other studies exclude such subjective factors from 
their models. I believe this is the better choice, but it does risk omitted variable bias 
if the descriptions reflect real differences. 
As discussed above, a few self-report surveys (generally focused on youth) have 
included both criminal conduct and arrest questions, and these also ask a variety of 
other questions that relate to some potential confounding variables.  It is possible to 
use these surveys to try to disentangle race‟s effects from those of other variables 
predicting arrest.184  These studies are not affected by sample selection concerns 
stemming from the stop decision, because their samples are not confined to those 
stopped.  However, they are still subject to concerns about omitted variables and 
about use of inappropriate controls.  If a study uses only self-report information, it 
may omit factors relevant to police decisions but not known to the respondent (or 
asked about by the survey).  Self-report data can sometimes be linked to official 
outcome data, but this does not really help with the omitted variable problem, 
because this official data won‟t cover people the police did not file reports on.  
There are no perfect choices.  In the best-case scenario, researchers will be able 
to make assumptions about selection bias and choice of control variables that have 
theoretical and/or empirical support and will investigate whether their estimates are 
robust to differing choices on difficult model specification questions. Careful 
observational studies of post-stop outcomes are potentially informative, but 
researchers must remember their limits. 
4. Exploiting Variations in Enforcers‟ Information About Race 
Some studies take advantage of variations in the information about race that is 
available to law enforcement. A couple have compared officers‟ traffic enforcement 
decisions to truly race-blind decisions: traffic-camera citations185 and citations issued 
via aerial surveillance.186 These are very informative designs, analogous to strong 
studies on other discrimination questions—for example, research demonstrating a 
                                                 
182  Robin S. Engel et al., Citizens‟ Demeanor, Race, and Traffic Stops, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND 
POLICING, supra note 6, at 297-99.  
183 Ridgeway, supra note 177, at 34-35. 
184 See, e.g., Kirk, supra note 97. 
185 Montgomery County Department of Police, “Traffic Stop Data Analysis: Third Report,” 2002. 
186 E.H. McConnell & A.R. Scheidegger, Race and Speeding Citations: Comparing Speeding Citations Issued 
by Air Traffic Officers With Those Issued by Ground Traffic Officers, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of 
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 2001. 
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spike in hiring of women when orchestras adopted blind auditions.187 A limitation is 
that race information is not the only difference between the decision processes: 
automated and aerial enforcement target only particular unlawful behaviors, whereas 
human officers can observe various potential violations.188 This problem parallels 
concerns about traffic benchmark studies that focus on a single speed cutoff.   
Several traffic-stop studies have exploited variation in race information in 
circumstances that are arguably more similar: day and night.  The studies compare 
stops at the same clock time but on either side of Daylight Savings Time transitions, 
such that they fall either just before or after nightfall. The intuition is that if higher 
black stop rates are driven by racial discrimination, the disparity should be reduced at 
night, when drivers‟ race is harder to see.  Studies in Portland and Cincinnati found 
no reduction in disparity at night, concluding that disparities were not caused by 
racial discrimination.189 Studies in Minneapolis and Syracuse reached the opposite 
conclusion; the Syracuse study, unlike the others, accounted for variations in artificial 
light.190 These studies are very clever.  But one interpretive problem is that darkness 
(not just clock time) might affect driver or police behavior through other channels, 
which the method cannot disentangle from the effect of reduced race information.191 
Still, the general strategy of exploiting variations in race information is promising. 
However, its potential is limited to narrow contexts: those in which enforcement 
decisions can be made without close-range observation of suspects. 
5. Lab Experiments on Implicit Biases 
Aside from these observational approaches, many lab experiments demonstrate 
the prevalence of “implicit racial bias,” including the association of blackness with 
criminality.192 For example, Eberhardt et al. showed that police subjects who were 
primed subconsciously with crime-related images then paid disproportionate 
attention to black faces. 193  Crime-primed officers (bot not non-crime-primed 
officers) also strongly tended to pick the wrong black face out of a lineup—a more 
                                                 
187 Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female 
Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 737-38 (2000). 
188 See Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 6, at 183 (citing these studies and raising this concern). 
189 Jeffrey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops from Behind a Veil of 
Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 878 (2006); Terry Schell et al., Police-Community Relations in 
Cincinnati: Year Three Evalution Report, Rand Corp. Technical Report 535 (2007). 
190 Joseph A. Ritter & David Bael, Detecting Racial Profiling in Minneapolis Traffic Stops, CURA Reporter 
Spring/Summer 2009, at 11-17; William C. Horrace & Shawn M. Rohlin, How Dark Is Dark? Bright 
Lights, Big City, Racial Profiling (2014) (unpublished), http://www.colgate.edu/docs/default-
source/d_academics_departments-and-programs_economics_colgate-hamilton-seminar-
series/horracerohlindarkness-1-14-14.pdf?sfvrsn=0 
191  Darkness certainly affects driving behavior, and could also affect police tactics, or police 
perceptions of black criminality. In general, fear of crime is dramatically higher at night. E.g., Kathleen 
A. Fox et al., Gender, Crime Victimization, and Fear of Crime, 22 SECURITY JOURNAL 24 (2009).  
192 See, e.g., B. Keith Payne et al., Weapon Bias. 15 CURRENT DIR. IN PSYCH. SCIENCE 287 (2006) 
(reviewing literature); Quillian, supra note 143, at 314-20 (same); Kirwan Institute, Implicit Bias (2014), 
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf (same). 
193 Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J PERSONALITY & 
SOCIAL PSYCH. 876, 885-88 (2004). 
41
Starr:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2015
STARR, EXPLAINING RACE GAPS IN POLICING 
 41 
racially “stereotypical” black face.194 A subset of this literature tests “shooter bias,” 
using computer simulations; subjects are asked to “shoot” armed characters but not 
unarmed ones.  These tests have found that players pick the right response faster if 
the image matches stereotypes (armed black or unarmed white characters).195 
These studies are randomized experiments—the “gold standard” for causal 
inference. Many are quite small. But outside the lab, Internet-administered implicit 
bias tests have been taken by millions of people. Some of these test the association 
between blackness and weapons, which is prevalent: one analysis found that 72% of 
respondents showed this association, and only 9% showed the reverse.196 Internet 
administration means test-taking conditions and samples are not controlled and 
respondents are not blind to the study‟s purpose. But people who choose to test 
themselves might actually be less biased than average, and if anything, most 
respondents are presumably trying to achieve an “unbiased” score. Moreover, tests 
that use subconscious primes and test quick reactions aren‟t easy to “game.” 
This research strongly indicates that implicit racial bias is fairly prevalent, 
including among police, but certainly not limited to them. Police and civilian subjects 
score similarly, and on some tasks they make fewer mistakes overall.197 As Tonry puts 
it, given the bias found among “every imaginable group in the population, it would 
be remarkable if criminal justice practitioners were not affected.”198 Surveys have also 
shown widespread tendencies to explicitly associate blackness with criminality,199 as 
well as overt endorsement of racial discrimination in other areas among a shrinking 
but still nontrivial subset of white respondents.200 
The great unknown is how these phenomena translate into real-world decision-
making by police.201 While researchers have not yet linked implicit bias scores to real-
world policing outcomes, such studies may be on the horizon. There are limitations 
to this approach, despite its promise: while the tests themselves are controlled 
experiments, using their results to explain real-world outcomes involves the usual 
                                                 
194  Id. at 887-88; see also Heather M Kleider et al., Looking Like a Criminal, 40 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 1200, 1200 (2012) (reaching similar findings with student subjects). 
195 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer‟s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to 
Shoot, 8 SOC. & PERS. PSYCH. COMPASS 201, 206-07 (2014); Anthony G. Greenwald et al. Targets of 
Discrimination: Effect of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 399, 401-03 (2001). 
196 Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 2007 EUR. REV. 
SOC. PSYCH. 1, 20. 
197 Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 
J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 1006; see generally Correll et al., supra note 195 (reviewing literature). 
198  Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the American 
Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUSTICE 273, 287 (2010). 
199  James D. Unnever, Race, Crime, and Public Opinion, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHNICITY, 
CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION 70, 71 (Bucerius & Tonry eds.) (2014). 
200  See, e.g., Frank Newport, In U.S., 87% Approve of Black-White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163697/approve-marriage-blacks-whites.aspx (reporting 2013 poll 
showing that only 84% of white Americans approve of interracial marriage). 
201 E.g., BLANK ET AL., supra note 84, at 72 (“L]aboratory effects…can rarely tell us the extent to 
which naturally observed disparities are the result of discrimination.”). 
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causal-inference challenges of observational research. 202  Moreover, the scores‟ 
explanatory value may understate race‟s total effects on officer decision-making 
because they test only specific subconscious mechanisms. Still, this research is a 
promising new line of inquiry into one plausible mechanism for disparities. 
E. Testing Racial Profiling: The Promise of Auditing 
 Despite decades of effort, our current methods of evaluating police racial 
discrimination leave much unknown. I propose a new method to supplement the 
existing toolkit. “Auditing” refers to field studies that compare the treatment of 
paired “testers” who are similar but for a characteristic of interest. Such methods are 
used often in discrimination research and civil rights law enforcement in areas such 
as employment, housing, and lending. I propose to use testers (probably undercover 
police) to interact with police or to stage behavior that could attract their attention. 
Although it raises potential ethical, safety, legal, and political concerns, which I 
address here, this approach has substantial promise, capturing most of the 
advantages of lab experiments while directly testing real-world behavior. 
1. Auditing in Research and Civil Rights Enforcement 
A good example of the auditing approach is Ayres and Siegelman‟s study of race 
and sex discrimination by auto dealers.203 The authors matched white male testers 
with black male, black female, and white female counterparts based on age, 
education, and assessed attractiveness; the testers all wore similar clothing and drove 
similar cars to the dealerships, where they negotiated prices on cars; black testers got 
substantially worse offers. 204  Other studies have used similar methods to study 
housing and employment markets,205 plus various other phenomena—for example, a 
recent study found that drivers are less willing to yield to black jaywalkers.206  
 Instead of live testers, some studies manipulate only fictitious written 
information, such as employment applications,207 student emails to professors,208 and 
                                                 
202 For example, an officer‟s experiences could influence both her IBT scores and her stop practices. 
203 Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. 
ECON. REV. 304 (1995). 
204 Id. at 306, 319. The evidence of gender discrimination was less clear. 
205 E.g., J. Yinger, Measuring Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881 (1986); see 
BLANK ET AL., supra note 84, at 106-07 (reviewing housing research); P.A. Riach & J. Rich, Field 
Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place, 112 ECON. J. F480, F510-F513 (2002) same); Devah 
Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimination, 609 ANNALS 104, 114 
(reviewing employment research); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 
(2003) (studying effects of criminal records and race on employment). 
206 Tara Goddard et al., Racial Bias in Driver Yielding Behavior at Crosswalks, Portland State University, 
Working Paper, 2, http://ppms.otrec.us/media/project_files/TRF_Crosswalkpaper_Final.pdf; see 
BLANK ET AL., supra note 84, at 104-08 (reviewing auditing literature); Riach & Rich, supra note 205; 
Pager, supra note 205, at 113 tbl. 1 (same). 
207 E.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha 
and Jamal?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004); Pager, supra note 205, at 942-43 (reviewing studies). 
208  Katherine L. Milkman et al., What Happens Before? A Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and 
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writing samples.209 Such designs allow true experimental manipulation of race and 
gender, which in-person tester studies don‟t quite achieve: one can randomize cases 
between testers, but one can‟t make the same tester white in one case and black in 
another. Instead, in-person auditing depends on careful matching and training to 
minimize within-pair variation.  
No similar studies address U.S. law enforcement. In 1994, one criminal 
defendant introduced evidence from testers that he had hired to assess whether race 
affected Border Patrol stops. But the experiment was tiny and unscientific; the 
unpersuaded court observed that many relevant conditions had not been held 
constant.210  A Mexico City study used testers who committed illegal left turns to test 
perceived-socioeconomic-status effects on police demands for bribes. 211  Another 
study focused not on police, but on private party suspicions of crime, testing store 
clerks‟ reactions to white and black shoppers.212 An ABC News mini-experiment 
likewise tested private observers: actors cut the lock off a bicycle, and passerby 
reactions to the black actor were much more hostile.213 
The use of testers is also a well-established civil rights enforcement strategy. In 
the 1950s, testers brought suits challenging public transit discrimination, and the 
Supreme Court upheld their standing.214 Testers have played a prominent role in 
housing discrimination enforcement; the federal government has funded large tester 
studies and backed tester lawsuits brought by local fair housing associations. 215 
Testers have also brought challenges to lending discrimination. 216  The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission has endorsed use of testers to challenge 
hiring discrimination,217 though few cases have been brought.218  
2. Auditing the Police: Key Research Design Considerations 
Is auditing the police realistic? There are some good reasons that this hasn‟t been 
done before,219 but I believe these can be addressed with careful research design. 
                                                 
209 Arin N. Reeves, Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions of 
Writing Skills, NEXTIONS 4-6 (Apr. 4, 2014). 
210 United States v. Beasley, 36 F.3d 1106, 1994 WL 504182, *4 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished). 
211 Brian J. Fried et al., Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad, 45 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010). 
212 George E. Schreer et. al, “Shopping While Black”: Examining Racial Discrimination in a Retail Setting, 
39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432 (2009). 
213 ABC, What Would You Do? (Bike Thief),  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0kV_b3IK9M. 
214 Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).  
215 See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (upholding tester standing); Michael 
Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1401, 1426 (1998); M.A. Turner et 
al., Discrimination in Metropolitan Housing Markets: National Results from Phase I HDS 2000 (2002). 
216 Steve Tomkowiak, Using Testing Evidence in Mortgage Lending Discrimination Cases, 41 URB. LAW. 319, 
326-336 (2009). 
217 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm., Dec. No. N-915-062, Policy Guidance on the Use of 
EEO Testers, Nov. 20, 1990; Julie Lee & Caitlin Liu, Measuring Discrimination in the Workplace, 6 U. CHI. 
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 195, 213 (1999). 
218 Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling Bias in Hiring, 68 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 238, 256 (2012).  
219 Indeed, aside from the Beasley defendant‟s effort, see supra note 210, it has hardly been suggested. 
One scholarly piece and one news article each give the idea a sentence or two. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, 
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Here, I address several objectives that researchers must balance: safety, legality, 
importance, methodological rigor, statistical power, and cost concerns. 
Safety. A paramount concern is minimizing risk to testers, police, and third 
parties. The research designs I propose below involve no serious law-breaking, nor 
do they suggest a violent situation. They are not designed to test arrest probability, 
but to potentially elicit relatively minimal police interactions. Testers must be trained 
to be absolutely cooperative. The safest approach would involve law enforcement 
participation: voluntary or court-ordered police department self-monitoring or 
outside civil-rights agency investigations. Ideally, testers could be undercover 
agents—people who regularly carry out far riskier work than this—and police 
backup could be ready to intervene if any safety threat arises. 
The designs proposed below also pose minimal risk to the officers being studied. 
With just one or two interactions with each officer, they would be used to diagnose 
broad patterns, not to identify individual “bad apples.” They also involve very 
minimal officer time, minimizing distraction from ordinary public-safety duties.  
Legality. The criminal law constrains staging of actual crimes, lying to the police, 
and recording of interactions. 220  This is another advantage of governmental 
involvement. Undercover police routinely participate in otherwise-criminal activity 
and enjoy effective immunity from prosecution.221 Private testers can‟t be asked to 
commit serious crimes, but might choose to risk minor violations, as did researchers 
in several studies mentioned above: Lamberth‟s Turnpike study, the jaywalking study, 
and the Mexico City bribery study. Most of the designs proposed below involve no 
lawbreaking or lying, just potentially suspicious activity. 
Importance. Studies should focus on contexts in which there is reason to suspect 
discrimination (for example, large raw disparities, or citizen complaints) and in which 
discrimination would have meaningful consequences. But such contexts need not 
involve serious crimes. Misdemeanor enforcement can result in detention and 
substantial collateral consequences, can be highly stressful, may be a pretext to look 
for more serious criminality,222 and may be a method of expanding the surveillance 
“net,” exposing arrestees to more police interactions in the future.223 
Methodological rigor. The most obvious requirement for effective auditing is that 
the deception work. The interaction should thus be quite ordinary, brief, and 
                                                                                                                                     
Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2008 (1998); Emily Badger, Why It‟s 
So Hard to Study Racial Profiling By Police, WASH. POST, April 30, 2014. Reviews of methods for studying 
racial profiling omit it; for example, Blank et al. don‟t mention auditing in their chapter on police, 
supra note 84, at 186-204, even though they endorse it for other contexts like housing, id. at 103-117. 
220 In most states, anyone may record their own interactions without permission, though some states 
require two-party consent. Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, Reporter‟s Recording 
Guide 2-3, http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/RECORDING.pdf (2010).  There may also be a 
constitutional right to record police, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-84 (1st Cir. 2011), though 
some courts require open recording, Crawford v. Geiger, 996 F.Supp.2d 603, 614 (2014).  
221 Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 155, 157, 165-69 (2009). 
222 See supra note 121 (discussing Whren). Arrestees may be searched without warrants. 
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forgettable. Observations should be distributed across different police beats and 
shifts and across time, so that individual officers are unlikely to notice patterns.  
The primary threat to causal inference from auditing studies is tester 
heterogeneity,224 so testers should be matched carefully.225 Even so, subtle differences 
may remain, but training combined with simple, easy-to-replicate “scripts” can make 
these less likely to affect outcomes. Analyses could focus on outcomes, like whether 
any interaction occurs, that are unaffected by subtle differences in conversational 
styles.  Optimally, the testers should be blind to the study‟s purpose (for example, 
they could be told they are testing enforcement without mentioning the racial 
dimension),226 though this might be hard to pull off. But testers‟ activities could be 
recorded and later coded by persons who are blind to the purpose. 
One possible interpretive challenge is discerning whether racial differences in 
police actions might result from disparities in citizens‟ calls to the police, rather than 
police discrimination.  With police department cooperation, this mechanism could be 
teased out, because the police could collect information on citizen calls. 
Statistical power and cost. The sample size must provide sufficient statistical power 
to produce reasonably precise estimates.227 Ideally, this means at least hundreds of 
observations228--a plausible number (large cities have thousands of officers), provided 
the tests are spread across beats and shifts.229 Many published auditing studies have 
much smaller samples, allowing them only to detect large effects, and even then, 
imprecisely.230 Although larger samples produce greater power, they cost more, and 
may increase the risk of police noticing patterns. This is another reason to use 
designs that involve low-intensity, brief, forgettable interactions—they can be 
repeated more often at reasonable cost.  However, the interactions do need to be 
designed to elicit police responses reasonably often; to heighten the chance of such 
response, testers should be positioned near the known location of officers. 
3. Possible Research Designs 
Here, I list a few examples of research designs, leaving the details to be tailored 
to the city and police force.  
                                                 
224 See, e.g., James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 108-09 (1998). 
225 See Pager, supra note 205, at 111-12, 123-24. But researchers should avoid too-perfect matches on 
traits that themselves signify race (e.g., hair). See Riach & Rich, supra note 205, at F483-F484. 
226 See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 203 (using blind testers); Lee & Liu, supra note 217, at 224. 
227  Power analyses are typically framed in terms of hypothesis-testing, wherein power is the 
probability of obtaining a statistically significant result if the “true” effect is of a certain size. Power 
depends on sample size, the size of effect one seeks to detect, the statistical significance threshold, 
and (for binary outcomes) the baseline frequency of the outcomes.  
228  Sample-size calculators are widely available; they require assumptions about effect size. For 
example, if one seeks 80% power with a 95% confidence level, assuming the true probabilities for the 
two groups are 30% and 40% respectively, a common power formula requires a total sample size of 
708. See “Power (Sample Size) Calculators,” https://www.sealedenvelope.com/power/binary-
superiority/. If the probabilities were 30% and 50%, the sample size required would be smaller (182). 
229 For example, the Chicago police department has 279 distinct beats, each patrolled by eight or 
nine officers.  Chicago Police Department, “Beat Officers,” https://portal.chicagopolice.org/ 
portal/page/portal/ClearPath/Get%20Involved/How%20CAPS%20works/Beat%20Officers.  
230 E.g., Fried et al., supra note 211 (43 tests); Schreer et al, supra note 212, at 1438 (31 tests, 6 stores). 
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Open Container/Minor in Possession. Testers could walk past beat officers carrying a 
container of liquid, such as a soda bottle that resembles a beer bottle, testing whether 
they‟re asked what‟s in it. If the containers do not actually contain alcohol, suspicion 
could be immediately dispelled.  
Loitering. Testers, in same-race pairs, could hang out in public, testing whether 
police approach. To increase rates of police interactions, testers could engage in 
further “nuisance” activity, like playing music or smoking, or wear bulky clothing. 
Casing. Testers could wait outside jewelry or other stores, looking in—behavior 
that could be construed either as “window-shopping” or “casing.” 
Bike or car theft. Testers could break a bike lock or break into a car using a coat 
hanger—like the ABC News video described above, but larger-scale. In the car 
example, testers could carry the registration so as to dispel suspicion quickly. A 
challenge will be objectively differentiating hostile interactions from offers to help. 
Traffic violations. Testers could break traffic laws and see if they get stopped (and 
searched). While safety would be a concern, some traffic violations could pose little 
or no danger—for example, expired or missing license plates. 
Checkpoints. Checkpoints are promising settings for auditing: some law 
enforcement contact is guaranteed, the location is fixed, the setting is highly 
monitored and low-risk, and the testers‟ activity (just passing through) would be 
unremarkable. Outcomes could include time elapsed and diversion for extra 
searches. Agency cooperation, while not essential, would help; it would allow access 
to the information agents obtain when they run individuals‟ identification. 
Manipulation of Victim Reports, Police Files, and Training Exercises Other strategies 
could avoid in-person police encounters. “Victims” (perhaps themselves of varied 
race) could call in crime reports with varied suspect race, to test differences in 
dispatchers‟ response (assuming a mechanism is in place to quickly cancel the 
investigation). Race could be manipulated in training exercises involving assessment 
of case files or descriptions. Manipulation of police files could also be used to test 
prosecutors‟ charging or intake decisions.  
Responding to Citizen Complaints. Officers that staff citizen outreach or internal 
affairs departments could be tested to see if they respond differently to complaints 
about officers depending on the complainant‟s race.231 The test should focus on 
initial intake, with a mechanism for stopping the ensuing investigations. 
4. Advantages and Limitations 
In real life, race mediates the lives people lead, but auditing measures disparate 
treatment of individuals who are doing the same thing in the same places. This is 
both a strength and a limitation. On the one hand, it enables sound causal inferences: 
if we eliminate differences other than race, we can more confidently attribute 
disparate outcomes to racial discrimination. Auditing designs would be much better 
                                                 
231 See, e.g., New York Comm‟n to Combat Police Corruption, Follow-Up Review of the Internal Affairs 
Bureau Command Center 1-5, 17 (1999) (describing center that takes 20,000 complaints per year). See also 
Douglas S. Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing 
Markets, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 452, 456-59 (2001) (discussing phone-based auditing studies). 
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tailored to isolate the effects of racial discrimination than regression studies and 
other observational approaches. If testers are matched and trained well, it could 
approximate a true experiment, but in a real-life setting, not a lab.232  
 But auditing may miss dimensions of real-world racial discrimination. For 
example, if the police heavily target young men who dress a certain way, and virtually 
all such young men are black, perhaps clothing style is not a confounder that should 
be filtered out via the use of identically dressed testers, but rather a race proxy—a 
mechanism for racially disparate treatment. Similarly, most of the designs above 
would test disparities within neighborhoods (or at checkpoints), and would miss 
differences driven by neighborhood racial composition.  
The auditing design could, however, be extended to test the effects of such race-
correlated variables and their interaction with race—for example, by changing the 
same testers‟ clothing and/or sending them to different neighborhoods. An 
advantage over observational studies of inter-neighborhood disparities is that this 
approach could rule out inter-neighborhood differences in individuals‟ behavior, 
although it would not necessarily rule out all other neighborhood differences. 
Similarly, evidence that the police disfavor some characteristic like a clothing style 
would not definitively prove that they are using it as a race proxy. 
Auditing would produce context-specific estimates, not an overall measure of 
racial discrimination in stops or arrests.233 These estimates will be more informative if 
the test is similar to some class of activity that produces a reasonable share of the 
department‟s stops or arrests. Loitering and minor-in-possession are good examples. 
5. Implementation 
Given its longstanding role in civil rights enforcement, federal or state agencies‟ 
use of auditing to assess police disparities is plausible. Tester programs in other areas 
have sometimes been controversial,234 and may well be in this context as well, but 
there are countervailing political pressures. In surveys, large majorities oppose racial 
profiling.235 DOJ‟s Civil Rights Division has a strong interest in the issue and in 
police abuses generally,236 and the issue has been an especially high overall DOJ 
priority in the wake of the Ferguson shooting.237  
                                                 
232  See Quillian, supra note 143, at 303 (“[A]udit studies often are the best method for 
measuring…discrimination.”). 
233 Cf. Heckman, supra note 224, at 102-11 (criticizing employment audit studies for not providing 
estimates of market discrimination). 
234  See Selmi, supra note 215, at 1427; Alex Young K. Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect 
Discrimination, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1473, 480 (1993) (citing employer fears of tester litigation). 
235 Emily Eakins, Poll: 70% of Americans Oppose Racial Profiling by the Police, Reason-Rupe Poll, Oct. 14, 
2014, http://reason.com/poll/2014/10/14/poll-70-of-americans-oppose-racial-profi. 
236  Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/polmis.php; U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIV., GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES (2003), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf. 
237  Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder, Latest Developments in Federal Civil Rights 
Investigation in Ferguson, MO (Aug. 14, 2014). 
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Outside-agency auditing would lose some of the advantages of police-
department self-monitoring (for example, access to internal data), but it would 
otherwise retain the advantages of being able to use trained undercover officers and 
protect them from physical or legal harm. The outside-enforcement approach would 
face less risk of being compromised by leaks or internal resistance. It is the most 
plausible strategy when a police department is hostile to scrutiny. Auditing could also 
be required by court order or settlement in civil rights litigation. Analogously, a 
major benchmarking study was carried out by the New Jersey Attorney General‟s 
office pursuant to a settlement with DOJ, 238  and outside monitors have been 
appointed for numerous police departments under consent decrees.239 
Voluntary self-auditing by police departments is promising, but is it realistic? 
After all, adverse findings could be embarrassing and invite litigation. Moreover, the 
studies could be resource-intensive and risk angering officers and unions or even the 
undercover testers themselves. Still, while many departments would doubtless reject 
the idea, the 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the U.S. are not monolithic, and 
there may well be some who embrace the idea. Typically, agency heads are political 
appointees, and there is no reason to assume that all cities‟ political leaders would be 
primarily interested in hiding racial discrimination, rather than eliminating it.  
Hundreds of police departments have already invested considerable resources in 
collecting racial disparity data, and many have carried out ambitious studies.240 Some 
police departments have “early warning” programs to identify individual problem 
officers. 241  Any of these programs risks litigation or officer backlash—indeed, 
programs that risk getting individual officers in trouble may raise a worse risk of 
backlash than auditing does.242 These risks have not precluded their adoption. 
There is substantial precedent for undercover police work to help departments 
self-diagnose problems. Some departments use a practice called “red teaming” to test 
police responses to security threats and emergency situations.243 Undercover agents 
are also often employed in police corruption investigations. 244  Several police 
                                                 
238 See Lange et al, supra note 205, at 196-97. 
239 Floyd v. City of New York, 08-CIV-1034, Statement of Interest of the United States, June 2, 2013 
(advocating court appointment of monitor); Barbara Attard, Oversight of Law Enforcement Is Beneficial and 
Needed—Both Inside and Out, 30 PACE L. REV.1548, 1550 (2010). 
240  See, e.g., Engel et al., supra note 60; Ctr. for Policing Equity, What We‟ve Done, 
http://cpe.psych.ucla.edu/what-weve-done (describing CPE‟s work with police departments). 
241 Engel & Calnon, supra note 41, at 109; see Ridgeway, supra, at 21-30. 
242 Unions generally strongly oppose policies with potential adverse consequences for individual 
officers. Engel & Calnon, supra note 41, at 109; Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to 
Police Officer Accountability?, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 198-99 (2005). 
243 The term comes from military wargaming exercises. Michael K. Meehan, Red Teaming for Law 
Enforcement, POLICE CHIEF; see Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Subject Bibliography: Red Teaming, 
http://fbilibrary.fbiacademy.edu/bibliographies/redteaming.pdf (collecting sources); William H. 
Adcox, The Red Team: An Innovative Quality Control Practice in Facility Security, 74 POLICE CHIEF (2007) 
(describing “breach exercises” carried out by undercover teams at protected facilities). 
244 E.g., Steve Rothlein, Conducting Integrity Tests on Law Enforcment Officers, Legal Liability and Risk 
Management Institute, http://www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_update/le_integrity_tests.shtml (2010); 
see Tim Prenzler & Carol Ronken, Police Integrity Testing in Australia, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. J. 319, 
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departments (including New York and Los Angeles) regularly conduct “random 
integrity tests”—exposing officers to random stings. 245  Corruption is likely as 
embarrassing to police departments as racial discrimination is—yet these 
departments have carried out the corruption equivalent of auditing. 
But even if departments can be persuaded to undertake auditing studies, can they 
be trusted not to undermine their accuracy? Internal affairs divisions and police 
leadership have often been sharply criticized for papering over police misconduct 
and corruption. 246  Under the right conditions, however, the prospects for 
effectiveness are reasonable. Self-studies will be more credible if undertaken together 
with outside watchdog organizations or academic researchers who have control over 
data collection and analysis247--provided those outside actors are truly independent.248 
Undercover agents, presumably borrowed from other departments, would have to be 
carefully chosen, because they would have to be trusted not to tip off other officers 
or to try to manipulate the study‟s findings.249 
If police departments are reluctant to expose themselves to criticism and liability, 
or to anger their own officers, they could conduct internal auditing programs without 
publicizing results, or ask academic collaborators to publish anonymized results. To 
encourage self-studies, legislatures could consider enacting statutory evidentiary 
privileges. Congress has enacted just such “self-testing” privileges for mortgage 
lenders and creditors in the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act.250 These apply only if, upon discovering evidence of discrimination, the lender 
undertakes “appropriate corrective action.”251 If legislatures applied similar privileges 
to police self-testing, they would be modest extensions of the “self-criticism 
privileges” that law enforcement agencies already often invoke (which cover 
subjective analyses but not underlying facts).252  
                                                                                                                                     
319 (2001) (describing undercover integrity testing in Australia as an “essential” anticorruption tool). 
245 Rothlein, supra note 244; Prenzler & Ronken, supra note 244, at 321-23; Sanja Kunjak Ivkovic, 93 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 617-19 (2003). 
246 E.g., Ivkovic, supra note 245, at 596-97. 
247 This is the modus operandi of the Center for Policing Equity, which connects researchers with 
police departments. Center for Policing Equity, What We Do, http://cpe.psych.ucla.edu/.  See Merrick 
Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. REV. 151, 159-63 (2003) 
(describing some departments‟ voluntary use of accountability organizations, independent 
investigators, and civilian review boards to monitor use of force and corruption). 
248 Civilian oversight boards have often been criticized for being overly deferential to police. E.g., 
Stephen Clarke, Note, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Study of How Civilian Oversight of the Police Should 
Function and How it Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 11-12 (2009). Academic researchers with 
external (non-police) funding may be better equipped to provide accountability, but it will be 
important to negotiate agreements preserving researchers‟ control over reporting of results. 
249  Riach & Rich, supra note 205, at F483, worry that “consciously or unconsciously, minority 
applicants may be motivated to prove the existence of discrimination.” See Heckman, supra note 224, 
at 104. When police are investigating police, one might worry more about the opposite concern. 
250 See Tomkowiak, supra note 216, at 326-27. 
251  Id.; see ADI Consulting, The Self-Testing Privilege for Fair Lending Compliance, 
http://www.adiconsulting.com/Docs/2006%20FL%20Self-Testing%20Privilege.pdf (also describing 
some similar privileges developed by states). 
252 See Josh Jones, Note, Behind the Shield? Law Enforcement Agencies and the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege, 
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If government involvement proves impracticable, academic researchers might be 
able to carry out some of the designs on their own. Academic research is by 
Institutional Review Board oversight, 253  but IRBs generally focus on harms to 
subjects (here, police) and perhaps third parties. Here, essentially all the risk is on the 
research staff (the testers).254 But while the IRB may not regulate such risks, ethical 
researchers should consider them. While well-informed research staff should be free 
to take on non-zero risks (as much research does), supervisors should aim to keep 
this risk minimal, especially if they are students, who may be reluctant to refuse. 
Overall, while auditing designs could face serious practical and political hurdles, 
their use is plausible. They offer a potentially valuable new addition to the toolkit of 
researchers, civil rights agencies, and police departments. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no single correct empirical method for assessing racial disparities in 
policing, because there is no single correct normative conception of what kind of 
inequality we should care about. I have focused my analysis principally on how to get 
at two estimands that I consider especially important: first, racial disparity in police 
interactions conditional on criminal conduct, and second, the effects of police racial 
discrimination. The policing-crime comparisons that have dominated the literature 
give a skewed sense of the first, generally overcorrecting for crime differences. 
Meanwhile, several available methods for assessing police racial discrimination are 
useful, but are limited by various causal-inference and external-validity concerns; 
auditing, despite its challenges, is an appealing alternative. 
Some will no doubt disagree with me as to what the most important empirical 
questions are. I hope that this discussion might persuade those with different views 
to articulate them clearly and to employ statistical analyses and numerical 
comparisons that are consistent with their normative premises. An empirical analysis 
that is well designed to answer one question may produce dramatically wrong 
conclusions if it is misinterpreted as an answer to another. The conceptual 
confusions that have pervaded public and scholarly debates about race and policing 
are not merely a matter of laypeople misunderstanding statistics or activists 
strategically misusing them.  One can hardly expect more out of the public debate 
when much of the underlying empirical literature is itself riddled with the same 
problems. We can and should do better.  
  
                                                                                                                                     
60 WASH. & LEE LAW REVIEW 1609, 1611-14 (2003).  Federal privilege legislation could be grounded 
in Congress‟s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, and could perhaps extend to state courts. 
253 This may be true even if researchers work with government, depending on their roles.  
254 Research guidelines also generally permit dispensing with informed consent if the research design 
requires it (as it does here) and the potential harm is minimal. See Pager, supra note 205, at 126. 
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Table A1. Examples Assuming Racial Equality Conditional on Conduct 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Guilty Stop Rate: SG/PG 50% 25% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Innocent Stop Rate: SI/PI 25% 25% 5% 5% 5% 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Black Guilt Rate: PGB/PB 40% 40% 40% 8% 8% 96% 40% 40% 20% 
White Guilt Rate: PGW/PW 20% 20% 20% 4% 2% 92% 20% 20% 20% 
Num. Black: PB 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 4000 1000 
Num. White: PW 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 4000 1000 1000 
Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio 
(SB/ SW)  
(PGB /PGW) 
0.58 0.5 0.82 0.63 0.36 0.98 0.58 0.58 1 
Stop Share/Crime Share 
(SB/ S)  
(PGB /PG) 
0.81 0.75 0.93 0.84 0.74 0.99 0.68 0.93 1 
Hit Rate Ratio 
(SGB/SB) 
(SGW/SW) 
1.71 2 1.22 1.58 2.74 1.02 1.71 1.71 1 
 
General notes: 
a. All scenarios apply the same stop rates to people with the same criminal conduct, regardless of race. The 
first six lines show hypothetical assumptions; the bottom three lines show ratios calculated based on those 
assumptions. All assume higher black crime rates (except [9], which assumes no difference), paralleling 
the usual argument made in defense of policing disparities. 
b. Although all the stop rates in these examples are higher than one would find in most real-world policing 
contexts, one could divide every stop rate by 10 (or by anything) and it would not affect any of the ratios. 
c. The Hit Rate Ratio is discussed in Part II.D. It is 1 if stops are equally productive (likely to succeed in 
catching a criminal) across racial groups. Note that here, policing is racially equitable conditional on 
conduct, but (except in Column 9, where there is no crime difference) hit rates are never aligned. 
 
Notes on each column: 
[1] parallels the Table 1 example in the text. 
[2] and [3] vary the degree to which the police accurately discern guilt (i.e., varies the gap between innocent 
and guilty stop rates).  The Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures are less misleading when the police 
are more discerning, because there are fewer stops of the innocent. 
[4] lowers guilt rates for both races. Although (as in [3]) the police are ten times as likely to stop the guilty, 
61% of stops overall are of the innocent, and the Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures perform badly. 
[5] further lowers the white guilt rate.  With a larger crime-rate difference, the measures are even more 
misleading. 
[6] is the same as [1] except guilt rates are very high. With few innocents, and thus few stops of the innocent, 
the Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures are close to the true ratio of stops among the guilty. 
[7] and [8] are the same as [1] except that the relative population sizes vary.  Only the Share/Share 
measure changes as a result. It is always closer to 1 than the Ratio/Ratio measure, and is more “diluted” 
in this sense the larger the high-crime group‟s population share is. 
[9] is the same as [1] except it eliminates the crime-rate disparity. The problems with the Ratio/Ratio and 
Share/Share measures disappear; they emerge only when there are crime-rate differences.  
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Table A2. Examples Assuming Racial Disparity Conditional on Conduct 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Black Guilty Stop %: SGB/PGB 50% 50% 40% 50% 40% 40% 40% 50% 
White Guilty Stop %: SGW/PGW 25% 20% 30% 50% 70% 70% 70% 25% 
Black Innocent Stop %: SIB/PIB 30% 20% 25% 50% 20% 20% 20% 30% 
White Innocent Stop %: SIW/PIW 15% 15% 10% 10% 35% 35% 35% 15% 
Black Guilt %:  PGB/PB 40% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
White Guilt %:  PGW/PW 20% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 20% 
Number Black: PB 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 4000 1000 
Number White: PW 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 4000 1000 1000 
Stop Rate Ratio: Guilty (DG) 
(SGB/ SGW)/ (PGB /PGW) 
1.67 2.5 1.33 1 0.57 0.57 0.57 2 
Stop Rate Ratio: Innocent (DI) 
(SIB/ SIW)/ (PIB /PIW) 
1.67 1.33 2.5 5 0.57 0.57 0.57 2 
Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio 
(SB/ SW)/ (PGB /PGW) 
0.97 0.84 1.17 1.79 0.31 0.31 0.31 2 
Stop Share/Crime Share 
(SB/ S)/ (PGB /PG) 
0.99 0.94 1.05 1.17 0.58 0.40 0.80 1.33 
Average Stop Rate Ratio, Holding 
Guilt Constant at Black Mean 
(Weighted Mean of DG and DI) 
1.67 1.63 2 2.78 0.57 0.57 0.57 2 
Hit Rate Ratio 
(SGB/SB)/(SGW/SW) 
1.72 2.98 1.14 0.56 1.83 1.83 1.83 1 
 
General Notes 
a. The first eight lines are assumptions; the last six are calculated ratios that represent different possible 
measures of disparity.  In addition to the measures from Table 1A, this table includes DI, DG, and a 
weighted average of the two called the “Average Stop Rate Ratio Holding Guilt Constant at Black Mean.” 
These measures were not included in Table 1A because there we were assuming no disparities in stop rates 
conditional on conduct (so all of them would have been 1). 
b. The Average Stop Rate Ratio line represents one of several reasonable ways of averaging the stop rate ratio 
among the guilty and the stop rate ratio among the innocent to produce an overall average stop rate ratio 
conditional on criminal conduct.  It reflects a reweighting exercise that compares an observed outcome to a 
counterfactual outcome. It asks:  By what proportion does the number of black stops differ from the number 
that we would have seen if the white conditional stop probabilities had been applied to the black population? 
This proportion can be expressed as: 
                         
  
    
   
   
⁄      
   




This proportion represents the multiplicative effect on stops of applying the black conditional stop probabilities 
(instead of the counterfactual white ones) to the black population—or, put another way, it is the average 
disparity holding guilt rates constant at the black average. In the notes on Proof 3, I discuss two other, 
similar ways one might reasonably estimate “average disparity” conditional on conduct, holding guilt rates 
constant either at the white average or at the overall population average.  All three versions always produce 
average stop rate ratios that fall between DI and DG. 
 
Notes on each column 
[1] parallels the Table 2 example in the text. 
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[2] and [3] likewise assume that black pedestrians are much more likely to be stopped conditional on 
criminal conduct, but here disparities are not uniform across criminal conduct conditions.  The disparity is 
larger among the guilty in [2] and the innocent in [3].  The Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures 
again mask these disparities, or (in [2]) reverse their apparent direction.  One might expect disparities 
that are similar across conduct conditions (as in [1]) if police are paying more attention across the board 
to black pedestrians, or have stationed more officers in their neighborhoods. One might expect greater 
disparity among the guilty (as in [2]) if the police both are paying more attention to black pedestrians and 
are more accurate in discerning their guilt.  One might expect greater disparity among the innocent (as in 
[1]) if the police lower the suspicious-behavior bar for stopping black pedestrians, affecting mostly the 
innocent. 
[4] again assumes racial disparity conditional on conduct, disfavoring blacks, but this time it is entirely 
driven by a large disparity in stops of the guilty.  In scenarios with dissimilar disparities among the 
innocent and the guilty, it is possible for the Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures to be higher than 
DI but lower than DG(or vice-versa), whereas in most of the examples they are lower than both. (The 
opposite scenario would also be possible.) However, the Ratio/Ratio measure systematically misleads in a 
particular direction in the sense that it always appears to be more favorable to the higher-crime group than 
the true average stop rate ratio conditional on criminal conduct.  
[5] through [7] show examples in which we assume the true disparity cuts the other direction: white stop rates 
are higher conditional on criminal conduct.  The Ratio/Ratio measure now substantially exaggerates 
the disparity, making it look like white pedestrians are only 31% as likely to be stopped as black 
pedestrians, conditional on criminal conduct (when the actual assumed ratio is 57%).  The only difference 
between these three columns is the group population sizes, which affect the Share/Share measure only. 
When true disparities conditional on criminal conduct cut in favor of the higher-crime group, the 
Share/Share measure does not always mislead in the same direction, because of its “dilution” toward 1 
(relative to the Ratio/Ratio measure), which is more pronounced when the group whose shares are being 
compared (here, blacks) is a larger share of the population. 
[8] shows an example that parallels [1], except with equal black and white crime rates.  The Ratio/Ratio 
measure is no longer misleading—it matches the actual average stop rate ratio.  The Share/Share ratio is 
closer to 1, as in all examples. 
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This proof shows that when there is racial equality in policing rates conditional on criminal conduct, but crime 
rates differ and not all stops are of the guilty, the higher-crime group always appears relatively “underpoliced” 
according to the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio and Stop Share/Crime Share measures. The proof begins by 
showing that the Ratio/Ratio measure is less than 1 under these conditions (with the higher-crime group in 
the numerator), and proceeds to show that the Share/Share measure is also less than 1. 
 
Definitions:   
 Group 1 Group 2 Combined 
Populations                               
Stops                               
*Subscripts I and G denote innocent and guilty subsets.  
 
Assumptions: 
(a) Group 1 has a higher crime rate. 
   
  
 
   
  
 
(b) Equal stop rates of innocent.    
   
   
⁄
   
   
⁄
   
(c) Equal stop rates of guilty.    
   
   
⁄
   
   
⁄
   
(d)  For both groups,           and    are > 0. 
 
 




   
   
⁄
   
(1) Apply Population definitions to (a). 
   
       
   
   
       
 
(2) Rearrange terms. 
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(3) Simplify (subtract 1 from both sides). 
   
   
   
   
   
 
(4) Divide by equivalent terms.  
 [From (b), we know              ] 
   
    (      )
   
   
    (      )
 
(5) Simplify and rearrange terms.                 
(6) Add equivalent terms.  
 [From (c), we know              } 
                              
(7) Simplify.    (       )      (       ) 





   
   
⁄
              ( ) 
 
                     
  
 ⁄
   
  
⁄
   
(10) Continuing from step (8), add identical 
terms. 
                          
(11) Simplify.   (       )      (     ) 




   
  
⁄
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This proof demonstrates that if the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio measure is less than 1, the Stop Share/Crime 
Share measure is greater than the Ratio/Ratio measure. Above, in the second half of Proof 1, it was 
demonstrated that under this condition the Share/Share measure is also less than 1. Both proofs also work if 
all inequalities are reversed. Taken together, the implication is that the Stop Share/Crime Share measure is 
always closer to 1 than the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio is, unless both are exactly 1.  Definitions are the same 
as in Proof 1. 
 




   
   
⁄




   




(     )
⁄  
   
(       )
⁄
 
(1) Rearrange terms.               
(2) Add identical terms.                           
(3) Simplify.    (     )     (       ) 
(4) Rearrange terms. 
   
  
   
       
     
 
( )                       
  
   
 
     
     
   
  (       )
   (     )
 




   
   
⁄
   
  
(     )
⁄  
   
(       )
⁄
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Proof 3a.  
Definitions are the same as in Proof 1. The first step in this proof shows that the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio 
measure is always less than the Average Stop Rate Ratio as defined in the notes to Table A2 above, with the 
higher-crime group (labeled Group 1 here) in the numerator of all ratios.  Recall that this version of the 
Average Stop Rate Ratio represents the average effect of the inter-group conditional stop probability differences 
on Group 1.  (Using the parlance of the reweighting literature, this could be called the “average treatment 
effect on the treated,” expressed as a likelihood ratio.) The numerator of the ratio is the observed number of 
stops in Group 1; the denominator is the number that would have been observed in Group 1 if the 
distribution of guilt and innocence had been the same, but Group 2‟s stop probabilities (conditional on 
criminal conduct) had applied instead. 
 
Assumptions 
(a) Group 1 has a higher crime rate, so: 
   
   
 
   
   
 
(b)  For both groups,           and    are > 0. 
 




   




    
   
   
⁄      
   




(1) Rearrange terms from (a).       
      
   
 
(2) Multiply by identical terms.          
         
   
 
(3) Apply Stops definition.    (      )   
         
   
 
(4) Rearrange.         
         
   
        
(5) Divide both sides by      .  
     
     
   
    
   
   
⁄      
   










   
   
⁄
   
  
    
   
   
⁄      
   
   
⁄
       
 
Proof 3b. 
This next proof, which proceeds along extremely similar lines, shows that the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio 
measure is also always less than an alternative measure of average stop-rate disproportionality conditional on 
criminal conduct—one that holds guilt rates constant at Group 2‟s average instead.  This measure represents 
the likelihood ratio associated with applying Group 1‟s conditional stop probabilities (instead of Group 2‟s) 
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to Group 2 (which could be called the “average treatment effect on the untreated”).  Assumptions and 
definitions are the same as above.  Note that the overall “average treatment effect” for the population as a 
whole would be an average of these two versions of the Average Stop Rate Ratio, weighted by the sizes of 
Groups 1 and 2.  It thus follows from Proofs 3a and 3b that that overall average would also always be 
higher than the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio measure. 
 




   
   
⁄
 
    
   
   
⁄      
   





(1) Rearrange terms from (a).       
      
   
 
(2) Multiply by identical terms.          
         
   
 
(3) Apply Stops definition.    (      )   
         
   
  
(5) Rearrange.         
         
   
          






   
   
⁄
   
    
   
   
⁄      
   
   
⁄
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